ETHICS

Aristotle is distinguishing how "equality" functions differently in justice compared to friendship. In matters of justice, the primary form of equality is proportional to merit—meaning individuals are treated based on what they deserve or earn, such as rewarding someone for their effort or abilities. Quantitative equality (where everyone gets the same amount) is less important in justice—it comes second.

In friendship, however, the opposite is true. The primary form of equality is quantitative, meaning that both friends should give and receive more or less equally. Friendship is less about a strict calculation of what one deserves (merit) and more about maintaining a balance in the relationship so neither side feels it's one-sided. That sense of shared give-and-take is the foundation of friendship, while merit takes a backseat.

In short: Justice evaluates fairness based on people's qualifications or achievements, while friendship prioritizes fairness in terms of an equal exchange of care, affection, or support.

Aristotle is pointing out that friendship requires a certain level of closeness or similarity between the people involved. If there is a significant gap in areas such as virtue (moral character), vice (bad behavior), wealth, or any other important factor, it creates a divide that makes genuine friendship impossible. When the difference is too great, the connection breaks down because the two parties no longer share a common ground or mutual respect. In essence, friendship thrives on some form of balance or shared standing, and without that, it ceases to exist—or is not even expected to.

Aristotle is explaining that in certain relationships where there is a vast inequality—such as between humans and gods, or between common people and kings—the idea of friendship, as we generally understand it, doesn’t apply. This is because friendship is based on some form of common ground or equality, and when one party is vastly superior to the other in qualities like goodness, wisdom, or status, the foundation for friendship disappears. For example, we don’t imagine being "friends" with a god because they are so far beyond human understanding or capacity. Similarly, a regular person probably wouldn’t expect to be close friends with a king or a genius, as the disparity between their positions or virtues is too great.

Aristotle is pointing out that there are limits to how much inequality a friendship can endure before it stops being a true friendship. While a friendship can survive many changes or differences — whether in virtue, status, or circumstances — there’s a point where one person becomes so far removed from the other (in power, goodness, or perhaps even life circumstances) that the basis for friendship disappears. He uses God as the ultimate example: the vast "distance" between human beings and God makes the idea of friendship impossible, as the relationship is no longer equal or relatable in any meaningful sense. This applies to other relationships too, like that between a king and a commoner, where too great a disparity prevents mutual connection. Essentially, friendship relies on some sense of common ground, and if that vanishes completely, so does the friendship.

Aristotle is addressing a tricky question: Do true friends genuinely wish for their friends to have the "greatest goods" possible, like becoming gods? On the surface, it seems obvious that we should want the best for our friends. However, Aristotle points out a potential issue here—if your friend were to ascend to a godlike state, the fundamental nature of your relationship would change. They would become so vastly different from you (in power, virtue, or existence) that true friendship would no longer be possible. Friendship, as Aristotle defines it, relies on a certain degree of equality or at least compatibility between people.

So, paradoxically, wishing for a friend's extreme elevation, such as becoming a god, might not actually be a "good" thing for you or the friendship, since friends are inherently "good things" for each other. If the dynamic is destroyed, the relationship and its benefits disappear too. This observation deepens the discussion of what we truly wish for our loved ones and whether unlimited "gains" are always desirable within the context of a human connection.

This part essentially emphasizes that true friendship involves wishing the best for your friend, not in a detached or abstract way, but in alignment with who your friend fundamentally is. If a person wishes for their friend's "greatest goods," it means wanting the best for them based on their nature and circumstances. Aristotle points out that this wish for the best is tied to the essence of the friend—a human being, for example—and only applies as long as they remain who they are (such as remaining human in this case).

For example, if someone were to wish for their friend to become something entirely different, such as a god or a completely transformed being, this might disconnect them from the friendship. Friendship, as Aristotle sees it, is rooted in mutual recognition of each other's humanity or essential nature, and wishing for "the greatest goods" should honor that connection rather than alter it beyond what the relationship can uphold.

This part highlights a subtle but important observation about human nature and friendship. Aristotle suggests that while friends genuinely wish good things for their friends, there are limits to how far this wish extends. Specifically, he implies that every person naturally prioritizes their own well-being above all else. This doesn't mean selfishness in a negative sense but rather an acknowledgment of a basic human truth: people seek what is good primarily for their own flourishing.

In the context of friendship, this means that while you may deeply desire good things for your friend, you still fundamentally value what is good for yourself above all others. It's not about disregarding your friend but recognizing that humans are wired to be self-preserving creatures, aiming for their own fulfillment as their foremost concern. This comes into play especially in cases where extreme changes in a friend's life (like becoming a god, as Aristotle humorously speculates) would disrupt the balance of the friendship or make it impossible for the relationship to continue.