Book 8 / Chapter 8

Paragraph 2 - Equality and Friendship Among Unequals

Explanation - Part By Part

Part 1
Original Text:

"It is in this way more than any other that even unequals can be friends; they can be equalized."

Aristotle is saying that even if two people are unequal in some way—whether in status, wealth, ability, or otherwise—they can still form a friendship because their relationship can be "equalized." This means that in friendship, the balance isn't necessarily about being identical in every aspect, but rather about finding a way to value and support each other in a way that feels fair and reciprocal. Friendship has a way of transcending these differences when the proper balance or mutual understanding is reached.

Part 2
Original Text:

"Now equality and likeness are friendship, and especially the likeness of those who are like in virtue; for being steadfast in themselves they hold fast to each other, and neither ask nor give base services, but (one may say) even prevent them; for it is characteristic of good men neither to go wrong themselves nor to let their friends do so."

Aristotle explains here that true friendship is rooted in equality and similarity, particularly among those who share the same virtues and moral character. When two people are virtuous, meaning they consistently strive to do what is good and just, their friendship becomes enduring and solid because they are steadfast in their values and principles. They remain firm both in their own goodness and in their commitment to one another.

Moreover, Aristotle emphasizes that such friends do not ask for or offer anything dishonorable or morally wrong to each other. In fact, they actively avoid and discourage such behavior. A virtuous person not only refrains from doing something wrong themselves but also tries to ensure their friends stay on the right path. This is a key characteristic of genuine, virtuous friendships—they seek to uplift and protect each other's integrity.

Part 3
Original Text:

"But wicked men have no steadfastness (for they do not remain even like to themselves), but become friends for a short time because they delight in each other's wickedness."

Aristotle is saying that wicked or morally bad people lack consistency or reliability—even within themselves. Their values, behaviors, and desires tend to shift and change unpredictably. As a result, the friendships among wicked people are short-lived. These relationships aren't built on something stable, like mutual respect or shared virtue, but rather on shared indulgence in bad behavior or immoral acts. Since such foundations are fleeting and unstable, the friendships quickly dissolve once the enjoyment of those shared wicked activities fades. There’s no deep or enduring connection sustaining them.

Part 4
Original Text:

"Friends who are useful or pleasant last longer; i.e. as long as they provide each other with enjoyments or advantages."

In this part, Aristotle is explaining that friendships based on utility or pleasure tend to last only as long as both parties continue to benefit from them in some way. If two people are friends because one provides the other with something useful (like help, knowledge, or resources) or because they find each other enjoyable or entertaining, the relationship is conditional. Once the usefulness or enjoyment fades—whether it’s because circumstances change or the "advantage" is no longer needed—the friendship is likely to dissolve. Essentially, these types of friendships are transactional and not rooted in deeper, enduring qualities.

Part 5
Original Text:

"Friendship for utility's sake seems to be that which most easily exists between contraries, e.g. between poor and rich, between ignorant and learned; for what a man actually lacks he aims at, and one gives something else in return."

This part explains that friendships based on utility (practical benefits) are often formed between people who are opposites or have contrasting qualities. For example, a poor person might form a relationship with a rich person because they seek financial assistance, while the rich person might benefit by obtaining labor, services, or some other form of support from the poor person. Similarly, someone who is ignorant might seek friendship with someone educated or knowledgeable to learn or gain insight, and the knowledgeable person might enjoy sharing their expertise or gaining something else in return.

The key idea here is that these relationships are transactional—they arise because each person has something the other one lacks, and they exchange value to fulfill these needs. It’s not about intrinsic affection or genuine connection but rather about mutual advantage, which makes the foundation of such friendships less stable compared to those based on virtue or genuine affection.

Part 6
Original Text:

"But under this head, too, might bring lover and beloved, beautiful and ugly. This is why lovers sometimes seem ridiculous, when they demand to be loved as they love; if they are equally lovable their claim can perhaps be justified, but when they have nothing lovable about them it is ridiculous."

Aristotle is discussing the dynamics of relationships and friendships, particularly when they arise out of utility or unequal attraction. Here, he points out a specific scenario involving lovers—when someone who loves another demands to be loved back in the same way and to the same extent. Aristotle remarks that this can sometimes appear absurd (or "ridiculous") if there is a clear imbalance in their lovability. In other words, if the one demanding reciprocal love doesn't possess any qualities that would naturally inspire affection in return, their demand seems unreasonable and even laughable.

However, Aristotle adds a nuance: if both individuals are equally lovable, meaning they possess comparable qualities that inspire affection, then it might make sense for such a claim for equal love to stand. If not, the demand for reciprocation becomes unjustified. Essentially, he's hinting at the importance of balance and mutual worth in relationships—relationships that thrive on fairness rather than unrealistic expectations.

Part 7
Original Text:

"Perhaps, however, contrary does not even aim at contrary by its own nature, but only incidentally, the desire being for what is intermediate; for that is what is good, e.g. it is good for the dry not to become wet but to come to the intermediate state, and similarly with the hot and in all other cases."

Aristotle is pointing out an important idea about how opposites (or "contraries") relate to one another. He suggests that opposites don't naturally seek each other just because they are opposites—rather, they tend to seek balance or a middle ground. This "intermediate" state is perceived as good or ideal.

For example, he says it’s not good for something that is very dry to become fully wet; instead, the ideal is for it to reach a moderate, balanced state—not overly wet but not overly dry either. The same goes for other opposites, like hot and cold: the goal isn’t to completely flip from one extreme to another but to find a harmonious middle.

This concept ties into Aristotle’s broader philosophy of balance and moderation, where he often emphasizes that avoiding extremes and finding the "mean" or middle path leads to the best outcomes, be it in ethics, nature, or relationships. This middle state is where true goodness or flourishing often lies.

Part 8
Original Text:

"These subjects we may dismiss; for they are indeed somewhat foreign to our inquiry."

Here, Aristotle is acknowledging that while he has briefly touched upon certain ideas—such as how opposites (like rich and poor, ignorant and learned) may form friendships based on utility or the notion of intermediates being desirable—these points are not the central focus of his discussion on friendship. He is effectively saying, "Let's move on, as these details are somewhat tangential to the main topic we're addressing." His primary aim is to examine the deeper essence of friendship and the conditions under which true, lasting friendship arises, rather than getting overly caught up in secondary or less relevant observations.