Book 8 / Chapter 6
Paragraph 4 - Friendship and Authority
Explanation - Part By Part
"People in positions of authority seem to have friends who fall into distinct classes; some people are useful to them and others are pleasant, but the same people are rarely both; for they seek neither those whose pleasantness is accompanied by virtue nor those whose utility is with a view to noble objects, but in their desire for pleasure they seek for ready-witted people, and their other friends they choose as being clever at doing what they are told, and these characteristics are rarely combined."
This part is reflecting on how those in positions of authority, like leaders or people with social or political power, often categorize their friendships into two types: friends who are useful and friends who are pleasant. However, it's rare for the same person to be both useful and pleasant to them.
Aristotle is critiquing how such individuals prioritize convenience or personal gain over deeper, more meaningful qualities in their friendships. They don't seek out people who are both pleasant and virtuous (pleasantness that stems from good character) or people who are useful in a way that serves noble or virtuous purposes. Instead, these people often gravitate toward two types of individuals:
1. Those who provide enjoyment because they are witty or entertaining to be around (but not necessarily virtuous).
2. Those who are skilled at following orders or getting things done efficiently (but whose utility lacks a higher, noble motivation).
The issue Aristotle points out is that having these two qualities—being "fun to be around" and "reliably useful"—together in one person is uncommon. Essentially, these kinds of relationships focus on personal benefit rather than virtue or shared goodness. It shows how authority figures might have a more transactional or superficial approach to friendships.
"Now we have said that the good man is at the same time pleasant and useful; but such a man does not become the friend of one who surpasses him in station, unless he is surpassed also in virtue; if this is not so, he does not establish equality by being proportionally exceeded in both respects."
In this part, Aristotle highlights a key aspect of what makes a true friendship work when there's a difference in social status or "station." He argues that a good person, who is both enjoyable to be around (pleasant) and helpful (useful), won't easily become friends with someone significantly higher in social rank unless the person of higher status also surpasses them in virtue (moral excellence).
Why? Because for a genuine friendship to form, there needs to be a sense of equality. If one person is much wealthier, more powerful, or famous than the other, but not morally better, then the balance is off. Without equality in the relationship, the conditions for true friendship—as Aristotle defines it—just aren't there.
In other words, Aristotle is saying that good friendship requires a balance, and if there's a big gap in one's stature or achievements, it can only be bridged if the person "above" is also a person of great character.
"But people who surpass him in both respects are not so easy to find."
Aristotle is emphasizing here how rare it is to find someone who is superior to another person both in social status (station) and in moral character (virtue). Such individuals are not common, which makes it difficult for a "good man" (one who is both virtuous and pleasant) to form balanced friendships with people who are above him in rank. This implies that genuine friendships are often influenced by equality or proportionality—whether in personal qualities, virtues, or social standing. When one person is significantly "better" or "higher" in both aspects, it disrupts the balance, making such relationships uncommon.
In essence, friendships—as Aristotle sees them—thrive on a certain sense of equivalence or mutual respect, which can be hard to maintain when significant disparities exist.