Book 7 / Chapter 12
Paragraph 2 - The Nature of Pleasures and Natural State
Explanation - Part By Part
"Further, one kind of good being activity and another being state, the processes that restore us to our natural state are only incidentally pleasant; for that matter the activity at work in the appetites for them is the activity of so much of our state and nature as has remained unimpaired; for there are actually pleasures that involve no pain or appetite (e.g. those of contemplation), the nature in such a case not being defective at all."
Aristotle is discussing the nature of pleasure and how it relates to "goods"—things that are desirable or beneficial. He identifies two kinds of goods: those that are activities (things we do) and those that are states (conditions of being). Here's the key idea: when we experience something that helps to restore our natural state (like eating when we're hungry or drinking when we're thirsty), the resulting pleasure is only an incidental side effect of that process of restoration, not the core purpose of the action.
He contrasts this with another type of pleasure—one that arises without any accompanying deficiency or need to fix something. For example, the pleasure of contemplation (simply thinking deeply or observing the world) does not depend on a lack within us or the need to repair anything. In such cases, our nature is already whole or complete—there is nothing broken or "unimpaired" about it. This type of pleasure, Aristotle seems to suggest, might be purer or more meaningful than those linked to filling some gap or repairing our equilibrium.
"That the others are incidental is indicated by the fact that men do not enjoy the same pleasant objects when their nature is in its settled state as they do when it is being replenished, but in the former case they enjoy the things that are pleasant without qualification, in the latter the contraries of these as well; for then they enjoy even sharp and bitter things, none of which is pleasant either by nature or without qualification."
Aristotle is pointing out that our experience of pleasure changes depending on our state of being. When we are in a "settled state" (healthy, balanced, or content), we naturally enjoy things that are truly and universally pleasant—things that are inherently good or enjoyable. However, when we're in a state of deficiency or need (like being sick, exhausted, or hungry), we often find pleasure in things that we ordinarily wouldn't consider pleasant. For example, when you're starving, even bland or bitter food might seem enjoyable, not because it's inherently pleasant, but because it satisfies the immediate need to replenish your body.
This distinction is important for Aristotle because it shows that not all pleasures are equal. Some pleasures are tied to temporary states of deficiency and are only "incidental"—they aren't good in themselves but feel pleasurable because they fix a problem. In contrast, the pleasures we experience when we're in a healthy, balanced state are more genuine and aligned with what is naturally good.
"The states they produce, therefore, are not pleasures naturally or without qualification; for as pleasant things differ, so do the pleasures arising from them."
Aristotle is saying that not all pleasures are inherently or universally good ("not pleasures naturally or without qualification"). The quality of a pleasure depends on the type of thing causing it. Since the things that give rise to pleasure vary widely—some being truly good and others merely appearing to be—naturally, the corresponding experiences of pleasure also differ in value. In simple terms, just as objects or activities differ in how inherently good they are, the pleasure we derive from them can also differ in how good or meaningful it is.