Book 7 / Chapter 12
Paragraph 1 - The Nature of Pleasure and Goodness
Explanation - Part By Part
"These are pretty much the things that are said. That it does not follow from these grounds that pleasure is not a good, or even the chief good, is plain from the following considerations."
Aristotle is summarizing the arguments presented so far against pleasure being considered a good or the highest good (the ultimate goal). He is now shifting to clarify that these arguments don't necessarily prove that pleasure isn't good or that it can't even be the chief good. In other words, just because some people criticize pleasure or point out problems with it, that doesn't automatically make it invalid as something desirable or even fundamentally good. Aristotle is preparing to challenge or nuance these viewpoints.
"(A) (a) First, since that which is good may be so in either of two senses (one thing good simply and another good for a particular person), natural constitutions and states of being, and therefore also the corresponding movements and processes, will be correspondingly divisible."
Aristotle is explaining here that the concept of "good" can be understood in two different ways: "good" in an absolute sense (i.e., universally good for everyone) and "good" in a relative sense (i.e., good for a particular person or situation). He is saying that, just as individuals have different natural traits or states of being, the actions, processes, or experiences that are "good" can also be divided based on whether they are universally good or good only for a specific person or context. This distinction matters because something might appear as "bad" in general but still be "good" for an individual under certain circumstances. It’s a way of showing that the idea of "goodness" isn’t one-size-fits-all—it’s more nuanced and depends on perspective.
"Of those which are thought to be bad some will be bad if taken without qualification but not bad for a particular person, but worthy of his choice, and some will not be worthy of choice even for a particular person, but only at a particular time and for a short period, though not without qualification; while others are not even pleasures, but seem to be so, viz. all those which involve pain and whose end is curative, e.g. the processes that go on in sick persons."
Aristotle is arguing here that when we consider things that are thought to be "bad," their value—or lack thereof—depends on the context. He explains there are different kinds of cases:
1. Some things might generally be considered "bad" but are not bad for a particular individual in a specific situation. In fact, they may be the right choice for that person—like when something unpleasant brings a specific benefit to them.
2. Other things might not even be worth choosing for an individual, unless it’s under very rare conditions—for example, something might be tolerable for a short time or during certain circumstances, but it isn’t good in itself.
3. Lastly, he notes there are things that seem to bring pleasure but actually aren't true pleasures at all. These are cases where pleasure is mixed with pain, and the painful process is aimed at fixing a problem—like medical treatments for the sick. While they might provide relief from suffering, we don't consider them genuine sources of happiness or pleasure in the truest sense. The pleasure here is more about alleviating discomfort than producing joy.
So, Aristotle is refining the discussion about pleasure, showing how what might seem "bad" or "pleasurable" can shift depending on context, timing, and function.