Book 4 / Chapter 9
Paragraph 2 - The Feeling of Shame and Its Appropriateness at Different Ages
Explanation - Part By Part
"The feeling is not becoming to every age, but only to youth. For we think young people should be prone to the feeling of shame because they live by feeling and therefore commit many errors, but are restrained by shame; and we praise young people who are prone to this feeling."
Here, Aristotle is pointing out that the feeling of shame is more natural and appropriate for young people than for older individuals. The reason for this is that young people are more emotionally driven—they make mistakes more frequently because they act based on feelings rather than rational thought. Shame, in this sense, acts as a corrective force, helping to guide their behavior by discouraging them from acting dishonorably. This is why society tends to view it positively when young people are sensitive to shame; it shows they are aware of their actions and are trying to improve or avoid errors.
"But an older person no one would praise for being prone to the sense of disgrace, since we think he should not do anything that need cause this sense."
Aristotle is saying that it is not admirable for older people to feel shame easily because, by their age, they should have developed enough wisdom and moral discipline to avoid doing anything shameful in the first place. Unlike the impulsive errors of youth, older individuals are expected to act with greater self-control and ethical clarity, which means situations that could lead to disgrace or shame should ideally never arise for them.
"For the sense of disgrace is not even characteristic of a good man, since it is consequent on bad actions (for such actions should not be done; and if some actions are disgraceful in very truth and others only according to common opinion, this makes no difference; for neither class of actions should be done, so that no disgrace should be felt); and it is a mark of a bad man even to be such as to do any disgraceful action."
Aristotle argues here that the feeling of shame or disgrace does not belong to the character of a truly good or virtuous person. Why? Because shame arises as a response to bad actions—actions that, ideally, should not be done in the first place. He points out that whether the bad action is disgraceful in reality (truly wrong) or based on society’s opinion (viewed negatively by others), it doesn’t matter. In either case, a truly good person avoids such actions altogether, meaning there should be nothing to feel ashamed about. On the other hand, a "bad man" (someone lacking virtue) is the kind of person who actually does disgraceful things, which is why they are the ones who experience shame.
In essence, Aristotle is saying that shame is tied to moral mistakes—something the virtuous person strives to avoid entirely.
"To be so constituted as to feel disgraced if one does such an action, and for this reason to think oneself good, is absurd; for it is for voluntary actions that shame is felt, and the good man will never voluntarily do bad actions."
Aristotle is pointing out that it’s illogical to think you are a good person merely because you feel shame after doing something bad. Shame, in this sense, only comes after we've voluntarily done something wrong. A truly good person, however, would not intentionally choose to do something bad in the first place. In other words, the presence of shame doesn’t indicate goodness; the good person avoids bad actions altogether.
"But shame may be said to be conditionally a good thing; if a good man does such actions, he will feel disgraced; but the virtues are not subject to such a qualification."
Aristotle is explaining that shame is not inherently a virtue, but in certain situations, it can have some value. Specifically, if a morally good person were to commit a disgraceful action, they would naturally feel shame about it. This reaction shows a kind of moral sensitivity, which can be seen as a "conditionally good" response. However, Aristotle clarifies that this conditional nature is not in line with actual virtues. True virtues, like courage or generosity, are not "conditional" in this way; they are stable qualities of character that consistently guide a person to act rightly, rather than being situational or reactive like shame.
"And if shamelessness-not to be ashamed of doing base actions-is bad, that does not make it good to be ashamed of doing such actions."
Aristotle is pointing out an important distinction here. Just because it's bad to feel no shame at all (i.e., to be shameless and indifferent about doing morally or socially wrong actions), it doesn't automatically mean that it's good to feel shame for doing such actions. Feeling shame is not a virtue in itself, as it only reflects a reaction to having done what is wrong. His argument is that shame arises from improper actions, and ideally, a virtuous person wouldn't commit those actions in the first place. Therefore, while shamelessness is negative, feeling shame doesn't qualify as virtuous—it’s more like a response to having failed to act virtuously.
"Continence too is not virtue, but a mixed sort of state; this will be shown later. Now, however, let us discuss justice."
Here, Aristotle briefly touches on continence (self-restraint) and states that it is not a true virtue, but rather a "mixed sort of state." This means that while continence involves a certain level of self-discipline—holding oneself back from acting on improper desires—it is not the ideal state of moral excellence. True virtue arises when a person's desires and rational understanding are fully aligned, such that one naturally chooses the good without needing to exercise internal restraint or struggle.
Aristotle plans to discuss continence in more detail later, but for now, he shifts the focus to justice, which will be his next major topic of exploration. Justice, as one of the cardinal virtues, will be examined in terms of its role in society and how it reflects an individual's character.