Book 4 / Chapter 9
Paragraph 1 - Shame as a Non-Virtue and Bodily Condition
Explanation - Part By Part
"Shame should not be described as a virtue; for it is more like a feeling than a state of character."
In this part, Aristotle is clarifying that shame is not a virtue because it doesn’t represent a stable, developed quality of a person's character (as virtues do). Instead, shame is temporary and situational—more like a fleeting emotional reaction than something deeply ingrained. Virtues, in contrast, are enduring traits that shape how a person consistently acts and lives their life. So, shame doesn’t qualify as a true virtue because it’s not a long-term, deliberate aspect of who someone is; it is more like an instinctive feeling that arises in specific moments.
"It is defined, at any rate, as a kind of fear of dishonour, and produces an effect similar to that produced by fear of danger;"
Aristotle is saying that shame can best be understood as a specific kind of fear—a fear of being dishonored or losing respect in the eyes of others. This type of fear affects people in ways that are comparable to the fear of physical danger. Just as fear of danger can trigger strong emotional and physical reactions, like trembling or freezing, the fear tied to shame causes a person to react emotionally and physically, such as blushing or feeling deeply uncomfortable.
"for people who feel disgraced blush, and those who fear death turn pale."
In this part, Aristotle is pointing out the physical reactions people have in response to emotions like shame (blushing when they feel disgraced) or fear (turning pale when afraid of death). By highlighting these bodily responses, he is emphasizing that shame is closer to an emotional reaction or feeling than a developed, stable trait or virtue. It’s something instinctive and immediate, rather than a deep part of one’s moral character.
"Both, therefore, seem to be in a sense bodily conditions, which is thought to be characteristic of feeling rather than of a state of character."
In this part, Aristotle is pointing out that shame is more of an emotional reaction (a feeling) rather than a deep, stable part of who we are (a state of character, as he calls it). He’s saying that shame, like fear, is tied to physical responses in the body—blushing when we feel embarrassed, for example, or turning pale when we're terrified. Because these reactions are tied to fleeting emotions and not something enduring or reflective of our moral character, shame doesn’t qualify as a true virtue in his view. Virtues, for Aristotle, are steady, cultivated traits, while feelings like shame come and go depending on the situation and stimulus.