Book 2 / Chapter 7
Paragraph 5 - The Mean in Passions and Virtues
Explanation - Part By Part
"There are also means in the passions and concerned with the passions; since shame is not a virtue, and yet praise is extended to the modest man."
Aristotle is pointing out that there are balances or "means" not just in actions, but also in emotional responses—or what he calls "passions." He acknowledges that while shame itself isn't technically a "virtue" (in the same way courage or generosity are virtues), people still admire and praise individuals who exhibit modesty—a balanced sense of shame. This means that having the proper level of shame in appropriate situations is seen as a positive quality, even though shame on its own isn't classified as a virtue in the strictest sense.
"For even in these matters one man is said to be intermediate, and another to exceed, as for instance the bashful man who is ashamed of everything; while he who falls short or is not ashamed of anything at all is shameless, and the intermediate person is modest."
Aristotle is emphasizing that the idea of the "mean," or balance, doesn't only apply to virtues of action but also to emotional responses, like feelings of shame. On one extreme, you have someone who is excessively bashful, feeling ashamed of everything, even when there's no good reason to be. On the other extreme, there's the shameless person who feels no embarrassment or guilt, even when they should. The person in the middle, who feels shame appropriately when it's justified, is considered modest, reflecting the right balance. The point is that even our emotions can have an ideal balance between excess and deficiency, and this balanced state is praiseworthy.
"Righteous indignation is a mean between envy and spite, and these states are concerned with the pain and pleasure that are felt at the fortunes of our neighbours; the man who is characterized by righteous indignation is pained at undeserved good fortune, the envious man, going beyond him, is pained at all good fortune, and the spiteful man falls so far short of being pained that he even rejoices."
This part focuses on how people react emotionally to the success or fortune of others and identifies a balanced, virtuous reaction as the ideal. Aristotle describes righteous indignation as the middle ground, or the "mean," between two problematic extremes: envy and spite.
- Someone with righteous indignation feels upset or pained only when another person receives good fortune they don’t deserve. This reaction isn't driven by malice or pettiness but is rooted in a sense of fairness and justice. It's the appropriate emotional response when something unfair occurs.
- Envy, which occupies one extreme, is when a person feels distressed at any good fortune others experience, no matter whether it's deserved or not. It's excessive and reflects jealousy rather than fairness.
- On the opposite side, spite represents the failure to feel any pain when others receive undeserved success. In fact, a spiteful person may even feel joy at someone else’s bad fortune or celebrate injustice, which is equally problematic but in the opposite direction.
Aristotle's point here is that emotions about others' success should be guided by justice. The virtuous person doesn’t resent all success (like the envious one) nor is blind to unfair advantages (like the spiteful one). Instead, they occupy the middle, morally balanced position where they react appropriately to what’s genuinely undeserved. This reinforces his broader theme that virtues often lie in finding the "golden mean" between harmful extremes.
"But these states there will be an opportunity of describing elsewhere; with regard to justice, since it has not one simple meaning, we shall, after describing the other states, distinguish its two kinds and say how each of them is a mean; and similarly we shall treat also of the rational virtues."
Aristotle is signaling that justice is a complex concept and doesn't fit neatly into a single category or definition. He acknowledges that it has multiple interpretations, and because of this complexity, he will postpone explaining it in detail until later in the work. His approach will involve breaking it down into two specific types and analyzing how each represents a balanced "mean." Similarly, other intellectual virtues—those involving reason—will also be discussed later with more precision. In other words, here he's preparing the reader for a deeper dive into these concepts once foundational ideas are in place.