ETHICS

Aristotle is asserting that the highest form of happiness, or "perfect happiness," is found in contemplation. Here, contemplation refers to intellectual activity that is focused on seeking truth or understanding. He is preparing to argue why this type of activity is superior to other kinds of actions and why it is most closely aligned with perfect fulfillment or blessedness. For Aristotle, this argument hinges on the idea that contemplation is the purest and most self-sufficient activity, requiring nothing external to complete it. It is the kind of activity that allows a person to exercise their reason, which Aristotle views as the highest characteristic of human nature.

Aristotle begins by exploring what kind of actions would be fitting for gods, given that they are thought to be the most blessed and happy beings. He's setting up the idea that actions typically associated with human virtue—like justice, bravery, or generosity—might not apply to divine beings in the same way, because these actions seem inherently tied to human needs, struggles, and imperfections. For example, gods wouldn't need to engage in acts of justice like making contracts or returning borrowed items, because such situations would imply a lack or a need, which gods, being perfect, wouldn’t experience. By questioning this, Aristotle aims to highlight that divine happiness must involve something beyond the practical and moral virtues that humans typically strive for.

Aristotle is pointing out that if we think about the gods, we don't imagine them doing things like humans do to express moral virtues. For example, they wouldn't have to engage in acts of justice, like dealing with contracts or returning money, because those actions would seem trivial or irrelevant to beings so elevated. Similarly, they wouldn't demonstrate bravery by facing dangers or taking risks, because gods, being immortal and all-powerful, wouldn't experience fear or need to prove themselves. And when it comes to generosity, who would the gods give to? They don't need possessions or wealth like humans do, so these types of virtuous human actions wouldn’t apply to divine beings.

Aristotle is using this reasoning to argue that the virtues connected to human action—like justice, bravery, and generosity—are not the highest form of excellence. Instead, he is setting up the idea that the life of contemplation (intellectual activity) is more closely aligned with the nature of divine happiness, and thus represents the highest form of human happiness as well.

Here, Aristotle is reasoning about what kinds of virtues or actions we could plausibly attribute to the gods. If we claim that gods are the ultimate example of blessedness and happiness, it would be strange and even absurd to imagine them engaging in certain types of human activities. For example, why would gods need to demonstrate liberality (generosity) if they don't have material possessions like money to give? Similarly, why would we praise gods for being temperate (self-controlled), when they don't have physical desires or "bad appetites" to abstain from in the first place?

This highlights the idea that many virtues, like generosity or temperance, are connected to human limitations and needs. Gods, being perfect and free from such needs, wouldn't engage in these kinds of virtuous actions. For Aristotle, this difference underscores that the most divine kind of happiness must lie in something beyond these moral virtues—something aligned with their perfection and self-sufficiency, which he will soon identify as contemplation.

Aristotle is reflecting on the idea that gods are considered the most blessed and happy beings, but if we tried to assign common human virtues or actions to them—like courage, justice, generosity, or temperance—none of these would seem suitable or significant enough for beings as divine as gods. Actions tied to human life, such as dealing with money, facing risks, or restraining desires, feel trivial and inappropriate when applied to gods, who presumably exist beyond such needs or challenges.

At the same time, Aristotle assumes that gods are not passive or dormant—they are alive and active in some way. He rejects the notion of them being inactive or like Endymion (a figure from Greek mythology who was granted eternal sleep). Since divine action cannot be trivial or mundane, Aristotle is building up to the idea that their activity must be something exalted and pure, which he later identifies as contemplation.

Here, Aristotle is making the case that the highest form of happiness—what he calls "perfect happiness"—is found in contemplation, or intellectual activity. He asks us to consider what kind of activity is fitting for a perfect and blessed being, such as a god. Gods, as he imagines them, don't engage in human actions like making contracts, facing dangers, giving money, or resisting physical temptations—those actions are tied to human circumstances and needs, which gods are beyond.

Aristotle says if we strip away all typical forms of action or productivity from a being (like working, creating, or interacting materially with the world), what remains is the act of contemplation. For Aristotle, contemplation is simply thinking deeply, reflecting, or engaging with pure truth and understanding. Since he views gods—the ultimate example of blessed beings—as purely contemplative, he concludes that for humans, the kind of activity most similar to divine contemplation must be the highest and most fulfilling form of happiness we can achieve.

Effectively, Aristotle is elevating the life of the mind and intellectual engagement above other forms of action, claiming that engaging in thoughtful contemplation is what brings humans closest to divine happiness.