ETHICS

Aristotle is saying that while the life of pure reason (which he associates with the divine and the highest form of happiness) is the ultimate aim, there is another kind of happiness that is more closely tied to our human nature. This secondary form of happiness comes from living a life in accordance with moral virtues — virtues like bravery, justice, and temperance — which are inherently tied to our human experience and relationships with others. These types of virtuous actions align with what it means to live as a human being and are essential to our shared life in society. This means that while living by reason is the highest ideal, living virtuously in a human way is a deeply fulfilling and meaningful life in its own right.

Here, Aristotle underscores the idea that virtues like justice and bravery, along with other moral virtues, are deeply tied to how we interact and relate to one another in daily life. These virtues show up in practical matters—like fulfilling agreements, providing help or services, controlling emotions, and acting morally in various situations. This relational aspect—how we manage our duties and passions alongside others—is what makes these virtues distinctly human. They are not abstract concepts but play out in the fabric of community life, reflecting the nature of our humanity as social beings.

Aristotle is emphasizing the close connection between our emotional life (passions), our moral character (virtue of character), and our practical intelligence (practical wisdom). He notes that some aspects of moral character seem to be tied to our physical and emotional nature—things like desires, fears, and impulses likely arise from our bodily existence. These emotions influence our moral character, and moral character shapes how we respond to those emotions.

Practical wisdom, which is the ability to make sound decisions about how to act in specific situations, is deeply intertwined with moral character. To live virtuously, we need practical wisdom to discern the right course of action, but practical wisdom itself relies on a foundation of good moral character. Aristotle is saying there's a kind of back-and-forth relationship: practical wisdom helps guide moral virtues, and moral virtues make it possible to act in alignment with practical wisdom. This harmony between reason and emotion is what leads to proper moral behavior.

Aristotle is stressing here that moral virtues—like courage, justice, temperance, and so on—are deeply tied to our emotional and physical nature (what he calls our "composite nature," meaning the union of body and soul). Because these virtues are connected to our passions (emotions) and how we act on them, they are fundamentally human qualities. Therefore, the kind of life and happiness that arise from practicing these virtues are specifically human forms of happiness, distinct from the higher, more divine kind of happiness connected to pure intellectual contemplation (reason). In short, living virtuously in human terms aligns with our nature as embodied, emotional beings.

Aristotle is pointing out that the "excellence of reason"—the rational part of us that engages in intellectual pursuits and seeks truth—is something unique and distinct from the virtues tied to emotions and everyday human interactions. It's as though this ability to reason and contemplate exists on a higher, almost self-sufficient level. In his view, this form of excellence is less dependent on external resources or circumstances compared to moral virtues like generosity, courage, or justice, which often require specific contexts or material means to express themselves (e.g., money to be generous, power to act courageously).

Aristotle is comparing two kinds of lives: one based on intellectual contemplation (aligned with reason) and another based on moral virtues (like justice, bravery, and temperance) that involve interaction with others. He acknowledges that both lives require the basic necessities for sustenance—things like food, shelter, and general resources—but how much and in what way they depend on external factors will differ significantly.

For example, a statesman (someone involved in moral virtues and public duties) operates in a sphere that often requires more material resources, such as wealth, power, or physical tools, to carry out their work. This is because their actions, such as ensuring justice or bravery in society, demand external means for execution. On the other hand, someone devoted to intellectual contemplation (philosophical or rational inquiry) needs far fewer external things to engage in their activity. Contemplation is more self-contained and less dependent on material conditions.

So, while both lives require basic necessities, Aristotle is highlighting an important distinction: practical, moral acts often need more resources for their realization than purely intellectual pursuits.

Aristotle is emphasizing here that virtuous actions often require external resources or circumstances to be fully realized. For example, the liberal (or generous) person needs money in order to perform acts of generosity. Similarly, the just person, who prioritizes fairness and fulfilling obligations, also needs resources like money to return debts or offer assistance to others, as good intentions alone can be difficult to perceive—people can claim to be just without their actions proving it.

The same applies to other virtues: the brave person, who acts courageously, often requires a form of power or authority to carry out those actions effectively. Likewise, the temperate person, who embodies self-control and moderation, needs the opportunity to exhibit this virtue—without access to situations that challenge self-restraint, they cannot demonstrate temperance to others.

In short, Aristotle highlights that many virtues rely on specific external conditions or resources to manifest visibly in the world. Virtue alone is not always enough—practical circumstances often play a role in translating virtue into action.

Aristotle is pointing out a debate about what is more essential to virtue: having the intention or the will to act virtuously, or actually performing virtuous deeds. While both are important, Aristotle emphasizes that true virtue requires both—the right intention and the corresponding action. However, he notes that carrying out virtuous deeds often depends on external circumstances or resources. For example, the more significant or noble the deed, the more external factors (such as wealth, power, or opportunities) may be necessary to bring it to life. In short, virtue demands inner motivation, but putting that motivation into practice often depends on things beyond our control.

Aristotle is comparing two kinds of happiness or fulfillment: one that comes from intellectual activity—specifically, from contemplating truth—and one that comes from engaging in virtuous actions within society. He’s saying that the person who devotes themselves to contemplating truth, like a philosopher or thinker, doesn’t really need external resources (such as money, power, or opportunities) to engage in this pure intellectual activity. In fact, worldly concerns can even distract or interfere with such contemplation.

However, since this “man who contemplates” is still human and part of a community, he cannot ignore the human aspect of his life. Living among others, he will inevitably need to engage in virtuous actions—like being just, brave, or generous—which do require external resources to some degree. For example, a just person needs means to return favors, a generous person needs money to give, and so on. So, while contemplation might be the highest and purest activity, living as a human also involves practical, moral virtues that depend on "aids" or supports in life, like material resources and social interactions. This reflects the dual nature of human existence: we strive for higher intellectual and spiritual fulfillment but are still grounded in practical, everyday realities.