Book 10 / Chapter 5
Paragraph 5 - The Proper Pleasure of Each Animal and the Role of the Good Man in Judging Pleasures
Explanation - Part By Part
"Each animal is thought to have a proper pleasure, as it has a proper function; viz. that which corresponds to its activity."
Aristotle is drawing a parallel between the idea that every animal has a natural function or purpose (something it is inherently meant to do) and the specific type of pleasure it experiences. Basically, each creature's pleasure aligns with what it is naturally designed to do—its core activity or way of being. For example, a bird might find joy in flying, while a fish might find joy in swimming. Their pleasures are tied to what they are fundamentally suited for.
"If we survey them species by species, too, this will be evident; horse, dog, and man have different pleasures, as Heraclitus says 'asses would prefer sweepings to gold'; for food is pleasanter than gold to asses."
In this part, Aristotle is emphasizing that different species have distinct pleasures related to their nature or purpose. He references Heraclitus's saying, “asses would prefer sweepings to gold,” to illustrate this idea. Essentially, donkeys care more about food—or what they need to survive—than something humans might value, like gold. This comparison highlights that what is pleasurable or valuable depends on the being and its specific needs or instincts. For each species, its sense of pleasure aligns with its purpose, activities, and nature.
"So the pleasures of creatures different in kind differ in kind, and it is plausible to suppose that those of a single species do not differ."
Aristotle is saying that different species experience pleasures that are unique to their nature or kind. For example, what brings joy or satisfaction to a horse is different from what brings the same to a dog or a human—they each have "tailor-made" pleasures tied to their specific existence and purpose. But within a single species (like humans), you might assume that the things bringing pleasure would be the same for everyone since they share the same nature. However, as he later explains, this isn't necessarily the case—there can still be a lot of variation within a species.
"But they vary to no small extent, in the case of men at least; the same things delight some people and pain others, and are painful and odious to some, and pleasant to and liked by others."
Aristotle is pointing out that, at least for humans, what brings pleasure or pain isn't universal—it's highly subjective and varies significantly from person to person. What one person finds delightful and enjoyable could be unpleasant, even repulsive, to another. People's preferences and reactions to the same things can differ dramatically.
"This happens, too, in the case of sweet things; the same things do not seem sweet to a man in a fever and a healthy man-nor hot to a weak man and one in good condition."
Aristotle is pointing out that people's perceptions of pleasures or experiences can be highly subjective and influenced by their physical or emotional state. For instance, sweetness might taste delightful to a healthy person but can seem off or unpleasant to someone who is ill with a fever. Similarly, the sensation of warmth can feel comfortable to a strong, healthy person but might feel overwhelmingly hot or unpleasant to someone who is weak or unwell. This demonstrates how individual conditions greatly impact how pleasures are perceived.
"But in all such matters that which appears to the good man is thought to be really so. If this is correct, as it seems to be, and virtue and the good man as such are the measure of each thing, those also will be pleasures which appear so to him, and those things pleasant which he enjoys."
Aristotle is making a key point here about how we evaluate what is truly pleasurable. He argues that in matters of taste, preference, and perception, the perspective of a good man—someone virtuous and morally sound—is the most reliable standard. In other words, what appears to be pleasurable or good to a virtuous person can generally be trusted as actually being good or pleasurable. This is because the virtuous person's judgment is guided by reason and virtue, unlike someone whose perceptions may be distorted by vice, bad habits, or flawed character.
By this logic, genuine pleasures align with what the virtuous person finds enjoyable. What appears pleasurable to someone who is morally corrupt or undisciplined might not truly be good—it could simply reflect their warped sense of what is desirable. Aristotle is essentially tying the concept of true pleasure to moral and intellectual excellence, suggesting that virtue is the measure of what is authentically pleasurable or good.
"If the things he finds tiresome seem pleasant to some one, that is nothing surprising; for men may be ruined and spoilt in many ways; but the things are not pleasant, but only pleasant to these people and to people in this condition."
Aristotle is pointing out that not everything someone finds enjoyable is truly "pleasant" in an objective sense. People can have distorted perceptions of pleasure because of their individual circumstances, habits, or flaws. For example, if someone finds something harmful or degrading enjoyable, it doesn't mean that thing is genuinely good or pleasant in itself. Rather, it only appears pleasant to that specific person because of their "ruined" or "spoiled" condition—a result of bad choices, poor character, or unhealthy habits. Essentially, Aristotle is saying that pleasure, in its truest sense, is tied to what is genuinely good and virtuous, not just to what someone feels is pleasant in a subjective or misguided way. This reflects his broader idea that our perceptions and desires can be shaped (or warped) by our moral character.
"Those which are admittedly disgraceful plainly should not be said to be pleasures, except to a perverted taste; but of those that are thought to be good what kind of pleasure or what pleasure should be said to be that proper to man?"
Aristotle is pointing out that certain things which people might take pleasure in—like harmful or immoral actions—should not truly be called pleasures, except by those with distorted judgment or "perverted taste." These so-called pleasures come from improper or disordered desires, not from anything genuinely good.
However, when it comes to pleasures that are widely considered virtuous or "good," he raises a central question: Which pleasures are truly appropriate for human beings? In other words, he's asking what pleasures align with our nature as rational and moral beings, given our unique capacities for reason, ethics, and higher thought. He's probing the idea that not all pleasures are equal; some are fitting for human flourishing, while others might distract or degrade us.
"Is it not plain from the corresponding activities? The pleasures follow these."
Aristotle is pointing out that pleasures are directly tied to the activities we engage in. In other words, the type and quality of our pleasure are determined by the nature of the activity itself. If you want to understand what kind of pleasure is "proper" or fitting for a person, you need to look at the activities that person finds fulfilling or natural. Activities and their corresponding pleasures are deeply linked; one follows naturally from the other.
"Whether, then, the perfect and supremely happy man has one or more activities, the pleasures that perfect these will be said in the strict sense to be pleasures proper to man, and the rest will be so in a secondary and fractional way, as are the activities."
Aristotle is examining what kinds of pleasures are truly fitting or "proper" to a human being. He brings up the idea of the perfect and supremely happy person—someone whose life is fulfilled and aligned with the highest good. According to him, the pleasures that enhance or complement the activities this ideal person engages in are the ones that can be genuinely called human pleasures in the fullest sense.
In other words, for Aristotle, it's not just any random pleasure that defines a good life. The activities a happy or virtuous person undertakes—those that fulfill their purpose or "function" as a human—determine the highest and most proper pleasures. These pleasures are tied to meaningful actions, like practicing wisdom, cultivating virtues, or engaging in noble pursuits, rather than fleeting or shallow enjoyments.
By contrast, other kinds of pleasures—those linked to less significant or even harmful activities—may still provide enjoyment but are "secondary" or less complete in their value. Their worth depends on how closely they align with the life of virtue and reason, which Aristotle sees as the core of being truly human.