Book 10 / Chapter 5
Paragraph 4 - The Distinction of Pleasures and Activities
Explanation - Part By Part
"Now since activities differ in respect of goodness and badness, and some are worthy to be chosen, others to be avoided, and others neutral, so, too, are the pleasures; for to each activity there is a proper pleasure."
Aristotle is pointing out that activities vary in moral quality—some are virtuous and desirable, others are harmful and should be avoided, and some fall in between, being morally neutral. Just as activities differ in this way, so do the pleasures connected to them. Each activity has its own unique type of pleasure that corresponds to it. If an activity is good and worth choosing, then the pleasure associated with it is also good; if the activity is bad, the pleasure linked to it shares in that negativity. In short, the moral value of an activity is mirrored in the quality of its associated pleasure.
"The pleasure proper to a worthy activity is good and that proper to an unworthy activity bad; just as the appetites for noble objects are laudable, those for base objects culpable."
Aristotle is saying that the value or morality of a pleasure depends on the nature of the activity it is tied to. If the activity itself is good, noble, and virtuous, the pleasure that comes from it is also good. On the other hand, if the activity is bad or morally undeserving, then the pleasure associated with it is also bad. He compares this to our desires or appetites: if we desire something noble and virtuous, that desire is praiseworthy, but if we desire something shameful or base, that desire is blameworthy. In essence, the moral quality of a pleasure reflects the moral quality of the activity or object it's connected to.
"But the pleasures involved in activities are more proper to them than the desires; for the latter are separated both in time and in nature, while the former are close to the activities, and so hard to distinguish from them that it admits of dispute whether the activity is not the same as the pleasure."
Aristotle is pointing out that the pleasures we derive from doing certain activities are more closely connected to those activities than the desires that lead us to pursue them. Desires, like wanting to eat when hungry, are something separate—they arise before the action and fade away after it's fulfilled. Pleasure, however, accompanies the activity itself and feels almost inseparable from it. For example, when you’re enjoying the act of playing music or solving a puzzle, the pleasure of that experience feels so tied to what you're doing that it might even seem like the activity is the pleasure. This close relationship between activity and pleasure can be so strong that it’s hard to tell where one ends and the other begins.
"(Still, pleasure does not seem to be thought or perception-that would be strange; but because they are not found apart they appear to some people the same.)"
Aristotle is addressing a misconception here. He's pointing out that while pleasure often accompanies activities like thinking or perceiving (e.g., enjoying a beautiful scene or solving a challenging problem), it is not identical to the act of thinking or perceiving itself. Some might incorrectly assume they are the same because these experiences are so closely linked—pleasure seems inseparable from the activity producing it. But Aristotle emphasizes that this overlap doesn’t make them the same thing; rather, pleasure is something that comes alongside these activities as a kind of added satisfaction or fulfillment.
"As activities are different, then, so are the corresponding pleasures. Now sight is superior to touch in purity, and hearing and smell to taste; the pleasures, therefore, are similarly superior, and those of thought superior to these, and within each of the two kinds some are superior to others."
Aristotle is emphasizing that just as different activities vary in their nature and value, so do the pleasures that accompany them. He argues that some pleasures are "superior" or "purer" than others, based on the activities they are tied to. For example, he considers the sense of sight to be purer than the sense of touch, and likewise, the pleasures associated with sight are purer than those associated with touch. Similarly, hearing and smell are seen as more refined compared to taste, and the pleasures derived from these senses are accordingly elevated in quality.
At the highest level, Aristotle places the pleasures of thought and intellect above all the sensory pleasures. For him, intellectual pleasures are linked to the exercise of reason and contemplation, which he associates with the highest function of human life. Even within these different categories—sensory or intellectual—some pleasures are more refined and superior to others. This hierarchy of pleasures reflects Aristotle's broader ideas about virtue and the pursuit of what is noble and excellent in human life.