Book 10 / Chapter 3
Paragraph 5 - Friendship, Flattery, and the Nature of Pleasure
Explanation - Part By Part
"The fact, too, that a friend is different from a flatterer seems to make it plain that pleasure is not a good or that pleasures are different in kind; for the one is thought to consort with us with a view to the good, the other with a view to our pleasure, and the one is reproached for his conduct while the other is praised on the ground that he consorts with us for different ends."
Aristotle is making the point that not all pleasures are equal or inherently good by comparing two types of relationships: a friend and a flatterer. A friend seeks what is genuinely good for us and accompanies us with noble intentions, while a flatterer is mainly concerned with making us feel good for their own benefit, often by indulging or manipulating our desire for pleasure. This distinction shows that pleasure alone is not the ultimate measure of what is good because the motives behind actions and relationships matter. A friend is praised for their virtuous intentions, while a flatterer is criticized for selfishly appealing to our pleasures.
"And no one would choose to live with the intellect of a child throughout his life, however much he were to be pleased at the things that children are pleased at, nor to get enjoyment by doing some most disgraceful deed, though he were never to feel any pain in consequence."
Aristotle is highlighting the idea that not all pleasures are worth pursuing or desirable, even if they bring immediate satisfaction or are free from negative consequences. For example, he argues that no rational person would choose to maintain the limited understanding or mindset of a child for their whole life, even if they continued to enjoy childish pleasures. Similarly, no one would choose to derive enjoyment from committing disgraceful or immoral acts, even if they experienced no regret or suffering as a result. The point is that certain pleasures are inherently inferior or inappropriate because they contradict our higher nature, dignity, or virtue, regardless of how pleasant they might seem in the moment.
"And there are many things we should be keen about even if they brought no pleasure, e.g. seeing, remembering, knowing, possessing the virtues."
Aristotle is emphasizing that there are aspects of life we value deeply, not because they bring us pleasure, but because they hold intrinsic worth. For example, simply being able to see, to remember, to understand the world through knowledge, or to live virtuously—these are all meaningful and fulfilling pursuits on their own. They are important and desirable even if they don't come with the immediate reward of pleasure. This suggests that not everything valuable in life is tied to pleasure, and some things are worth pursuing purely because of their inherent goodness or significance.
"If pleasures necessarily do accompany these, that makes no odds; we should choose these even if no pleasure resulted."
This part emphasizes that there are things in life we value for their intrinsic worth, not because they bring us pleasure, even if pleasure often accompanies them. For example, activities like learning, remembering, or practicing virtues are inherently valuable—they are worth pursuing on their own, regardless of whether they result in pleasure. The key idea here is that pleasure is not the ultimate deciding factor for what is good or worth choosing; instead, some things are valuable in and of themselves, independent of any feelings of enjoyment they might bring along.
"It seems to be clear, then, that neither is pleasure the good nor is all pleasure desirable, and that some pleasures are desirable in themselves, differing in kind or in their sources from the others."
Aristotle is making the point that pleasure is not the ultimate good ("the good" being the highest goal of life, something worth pursuing for its own sake). He argues that not every form of pleasure is worth desiring, and that pleasures differ in their nature and sources. Some pleasures are intrinsically valuable because they arise from noble or virtuous actions, while others are not inherently worthy because they stem from harmful or shameful activities. In essence, Aristotle is saying that not all pleasures are created equal, and we must discern which pleasures are truly valuable—those that align with virtue and contribute to a flourishing life.
"So much for the things that are said about pleasure and pain."
In this concluding remark, Aristotle signals that he has wrapped up his discussion on the nature of pleasure and pain. He has explored the arguments around whether pleasure is inherently "good," how pleasures differ in quality and source, and whether all pleasures are desirable. This statement transitions us to the next topic, implying that the conversation about pleasure and pain has been addressed thoroughly for now.