Book 10 / Chapter 3
Paragraph 4 - The Distinction Between Noble and Base Pleasures
Explanation - Part By Part
"In reply to those who bring forward the disgraceful pleasures one may say that these are not pleasant; if things are pleasant to people of vicious constitution, we must not suppose that they are also pleasant to others than these, just as we do not reason so about the things that are wholesome or sweet or bitter to sick people, or ascribe whiteness to the things that seem white to those suffering from a disease of the eye."
Aristotle is addressing the argument that some pleasures, particularly those considered shameful or disgraceful, might challenge the idea of pleasure being inherently good. He responds by suggesting that these so-called "disgraceful pleasures" are not truly pleasurable in an objective sense. Instead, they appear pleasant only to people with a "vicious constitution"—that is, people with immoral or flawed character. He draws an analogy: just as a sick person's perception of what is sweet, bitter, or white is distorted due to their condition, those with corrupt moral natures have a distorted sense of pleasure. What seems pleasurable to them isn't universally or genuinely pleasant; it is more a reflection of their impaired judgment or character rather than of the true nature of the pleasure itself.
"Or one might answer thus-that the pleasures are desirable, but not from these sources, as wealth is desirable, but not as the reward of betrayal, and health, but not at the cost of eating anything and everything."
Aristotle is saying that while pleasures might generally be desirable, the way in which they are obtained matters a lot. For example, wealth is something people naturally desire, but if it comes from immoral actions, like betraying someone, it is not truly desirable in the right sense. Similarly, health is a desirable state, but it shouldn’t be pursued through reckless or harmful behavior, like eating absolutely everything without regard for consequences. The point is that the source or means of achieving something desirable—like pleasure, wealth, or health—is just as important as the thing itself.
"Or perhaps pleasures differ in kind; for those derived from noble sources are different from those derived from base sources, and one cannot the pleasure of the just man without being just, nor that of the musical man without being musical, and so on."
Aristotle is saying that not all pleasures are the same—they can be fundamentally different depending on their origin. Pleasures that come from noble activities (those that align with virtues like justice, wisdom, or artistry) are distinct from pleasures that arise from base or dishonorable actions. Moreover, he emphasizes that truly experiencing the pleasure tied to something virtuous or skilled requires being engaged in that virtue or skill. For example, you can't genuinely enjoy the deep fulfillment of a just action unless you're a just person. Similarly, you can't fully appreciate the pleasure of creating or understanding music unless you have the proper musical ability or understanding. Essentially, the quality and nature of pleasure depend on the moral or intellectual source it comes from.