Book 10 / Chapter 3
Paragraph 2 - The Nature and Perception of Pleasure
Explanation - Part By Part
"Again, they assume that the good is perfect while movements and comings into being are imperfect, and try to exhibit pleasure as being a movement and a coming into being."
Aristotle is arguing against those who claim that the highest good is something "perfect" (unchanging and final), while things like movements or processes (what he calls "comings into being") are seen as "imperfect." These critics try to categorize pleasure as merely a process or a kind of movement, implying that because it’s not "perfect," it cannot be the highest good. Aristotle disagrees with this overly simplistic way of dismissing pleasure as something inherently lesser or incomplete. Essentially, he is challenging the assumption that pleasure is just a fleeting or transitional state rather than something of real value.
"But they do not seem to be right even in saying that it is a movement. For speed and slowness are thought to be proper to every movement, and if a movement, e.g. that of the heavens, has not speed or slowness in itself, it has it in relation to something else; but of pleasure neither of these things is true."
Aristotle challenges the idea that pleasure is a "movement" (or a kind of process). He explains that all movements, like walking or the motion of the heavens, inherently involve speed (how fast they're happening) or slowness (how slow). Even if these qualities (speed or slowness) are not obvious within the movement itself, they can always be recognized in comparison to something else.
However, according to Aristotle, pleasure doesn’t exhibit this characteristic. Pleasure isn’t something you can measure in terms of speed or slowness. It doesn't flow or progress the way a movement does. Therefore, identifying pleasure as a "movement" doesn’t fit—it lacks the attributes that all movements inherently possess.
"For while we may become pleased quickly as we may become angry quickly, we cannot be pleased quickly, not even in relation to some one else, while we can walk, or grow, or the like, quickly."
Aristotle is pointing out an important distinction between activities like pleasure and things that involve movement or change, such as walking or growing. He says that while we might transition into a state of pleasure quickly—just like we might get angry quickly—that's not the same as experiencing or "doing" pleasure itself quickly. Pleasure isn’t an action or process that can be sped up or slowed down like walking or growing; it simply is an experience that unfolds in its own time. So, the idea of being "pleased quickly" doesn't really make sense in the same way that "walking quickly" or "growing quickly" does.
"While, then, we can change quickly or slowly into a state of pleasure, we cannot quickly exhibit the activity of pleasure, i.e. be pleased."
Aristotle is making an important distinction between becoming pleased and being pleased. He argues that while it's possible for someone to enter a state of pleasure quickly or slowly (for example, something might make you happy suddenly), actually experiencing or engaging in the activity of pleasure itself doesn’t work in a "quick" or "slow" sense. Pleasure, once achieved, is not something that inherently has a pace—it just is while you're experiencing it. Unlike a physical movement (like walking or growing), which can clearly be faster or slower, pleasure isn’t a process that speeds up or slows down after it begins; it’s simply the condition you're in.
"Again, how can it be a coming into being? It is not thought that any chance thing can come out of any chance thing, but that a thing is dissolved into that out of which it comes into being; and pain would be the destruction of that of which pleasure is the coming into being."
Aristotle is critiquing the idea that pleasure is a "coming into being" (a kind of process or creation). He challenges this by pointing out a fundamental principle: for something to "come into being," it must emerge from something specific, and its opposite should signal its destruction. For example, you might imagine clay being shaped into a pot (coming into being), and breaking the pot would reverse the process (its destruction).
But when it comes to pleasure, this logic doesn’t hold up. If pleasure were a process of coming into being, then pain would necessarily represent the destruction of whatever pleasure is being created. Yet this isn't how pleasure and pain actually work. They oppose each other, yes, but they aren't bound in strict relationships of creation and destruction, like Aristotle's example of something being made from or reduced to its origin. Hence, he argues that pleasure cannot reasonably be understood as a process of "coming into being."