Book 10 / Chapter 3
Paragraph 1 - The Nature of Pleasure and Virtue
Explanation - Part By Part
"Nor again, if pleasure is not a quality, does it follow that it is not a good; for the activities of virtue are not qualities either, nor is happiness."
In this part, Aristotle is addressing the idea that pleasure might not be a "quality" (a type of attribute or property), and he's arguing that this doesn't mean pleasure can't still be good. He makes the comparison to activities of virtue (like acts of courage or justice) and to happiness. Neither of these are considered "qualities" in the technical sense, yet they are undeniably good. Therefore, Aristotle suggests that it's not necessary for something to be a "quality" in order for it to have value or goodness.
"They say, however, that the good is determinate, while pleasure is indeterminate, because it admits of degrees."
Here, Aristotle is addressing a criticism of pleasure as being "indeterminate," or lacking clear boundaries, and thus supposedly not qualifying as "good." Those who criticize pleasure argue that true "goods" are precise, fixed, and fully definite (or determinate), while pleasure is variable and comes in degrees. Essentially, they claim that since pleasures can differ in intensity and type, this variability makes it unsuitable to classify pleasure as something inherently and reliably "good." Aristotle is laying the groundwork to counter this argument by showing that variability or degrees do not disqualify something from being good.
"Now if it is from the feeling of pleasure that they judge thus, the same will be true of justice and the other virtues, in respect of which we plainly say that people of a certain character are so more or less, and act more or less in accordance with these virtues; for people may be more just or brave, and it is possible also to act justly or temperately more or less."
In this part, Aristotle is addressing a specific criticism about pleasure: the claim that pleasure cannot be considered "good" because it varies or admits degrees (e.g., some pleasures are stronger or weaker, more or less intense). Aristotle counters this by pointing out that the same variation applies to virtues like justice or bravery. People can exhibit these virtues "more or less"—in other words, someone can be more just or braver than someone else, and actions can also reflect varying degrees of justice or temperance.
By this comparison, Aristotle is essentially saying that the fact that something varies in degree doesn’t disqualify it from being good. If it did, we’d also have to disqualify virtues—which we clearly recognize as good—from being counted as such. Thus, he’s defending the idea that variability or gradation in something (like pleasure) doesn’t exclude it from being a part of the moral good.
"But if their judgement is based on the various pleasures, surely they are not stating the real cause, if in fact some pleasures are unmixed and others mixed."
In this part, Aristotle is addressing people who argue that pleasure is not inherently good because it is "indeterminate" — meaning it can vary widely and doesn't have a clear, fixed nature. These critics might base this judgment on the fact that some pleasures are “mixed” (combined with something else, like pain or effort), while others are “unmixed” (pure and untainted). Aristotle counters by saying that if their argument relies on this distinction between mixed and unmixed pleasures, they're not identifying the true reason for their claim. In other words, just pointing out that there are different types of pleasure does not prove that pleasure, as a concept, is not good. The variability of pleasure doesn’t undermine its value.
"Again, just as health admits of degrees without being indeterminate, why should not pleasure? The same proportion is not found in all things, nor a single proportion always in the same thing, but it may be relaxed and yet persist up to a point, and it may differ in degree."
Aristotle here is arguing against the idea that pleasures cannot be "good" because they are "indeterminate" (i.e., they vary in intensity or degree). He uses the example of health to make his point: health admits of degrees—you can be healthier or less healthy—but this doesn't mean health is undefined or lacks a set nature. Similarly, he suggests that pleasure, even though it comes in varying degrees or intensities, could still be a "good" and have its own definite nature.
He further comments on how different things—whether in their structure, behavior, or quality—don’t always follow a single, fixed pattern or ratio but can still maintain their essence up to a certain limit or proportion. In applying this logic to pleasure, Aristotle is saying that just because pleasures differ in degree or experience doesn’t mean their value or "goodness" is questionable.
"The case of pleasure also may therefore be of this kind."
Aristotle is arguing that pleasure, like other concepts such as health or virtues, can vary in degree without losing its fundamental "determinate" nature. By this, he means that just because pleasure admits of variation (some pleasures being more intense or pure than others), it does not make it chaotic, vague, or indeterminate. Just as health can exist in various degrees (someone can be healthier or less healthy), and yet remain health, the same logic applies to pleasure. Pleasure, too, can come in differing forms and intensities while still remaining a definite and recognizable good. Therefore, he rejects the idea that the variability of pleasure makes it inherently flawed or inferior as a concept of "the good."