Book 10 / Chapter 2
Paragraph 2 - The Nature of the Good and Its Desirability
Explanation - Part By Part
"This argument seems to show it to be one of the goods, and no more a good than any other; for every good is more worthy of choice along with another good than taken alone."
Here, Aristotle is discussing an idea that emerged from Eudoxus' earlier argument that pleasure is the highest good. While Eudoxus believed adding pleasure to other things makes those things better and thus implied that pleasure is "the good," Aristotle critiques this reasoning. He points out that this line of thinking shows that pleasure is just one of the goods among many, not necessarily the ultimate or highest good. Why? Because any good thing—not just pleasure—is usually found to be more desirable when combined with another good than when it stands alone. For instance, wisdom is good, and courage is good, but having both together is better than just having one of them.
This is a subtle argument implying that true "ultimate good" would not depend on being enhanced by something else—its goodness would stand entirely on its own. Pleasure, by Aristotle's reasoning here, seems to lose the claim of being the ultimate good because it improves when paired with other goods, meaning it isn't fully self-sufficient or complete on its own.
"And so it is by an argument of this kind that Plato proves the good not to be pleasure; he argues that the pleasant life is more desirable with wisdom than without, and that if the mixture is better, pleasure is not the good; for the good cannot become more desirable by the addition of anything to it."
Aristotle is pointing out a key argument made by Plato about why pleasure cannot be the ultimate "good." Plato reasons that if something is truly the highest good, it should be complete and sufficient on its own—it shouldn’t become better when combined with something else. For example, a life that includes both pleasure and wisdom is better, more desirable, than a life with only pleasure. This shows that pleasure alone isn't the ultimate good, because it needs something else (like wisdom) to elevate it. The true "good" should be so perfect that nothing could make it more desirable when added to it.
"Now it is clear that nothing else, any more than pleasure, can be the good if it is made more desirable by the addition of any of the things that are good in themselves."
Aristotle is making the point that if something is truly "the Good," then it cannot become more desirable or better by adding other good things to it. For example, pleasure (as an option for "the Good") fails this test, because it becomes more desirable when combined with something else, like wisdom or virtue. Essentially, the ultimate good—if it exists—must be completely self-sufficient and not dependent on anything else to increase its value or desirability.
"What, then, is there that satisfies this criterion, which at the same time we can participate in? It is something of this sort that we are looking for."
Aristotle is asking an important question here: What is the ultimate good that meets the criterion of being complete and self-sufficient—something that doesn’t become better by adding other goods to it—and is also something we, as human beings, can actively experience or achieve in our lives?
He’s emphasizing that the aim of this inquiry isn’t just abstract theorizing; it’s about identifying a meaningful and practical good that human beings can truly "partake in" or live out. In other words, he’s seeking something that is both the highest form of good and attainable in real human experience. This point is central to his exploration of ethics, as he’s not just after a theoretical ideal but something grounded in human nature and life.
"Those who object that that at which all things aim is not necessarily good are, we may surmise, talking nonsense. For we say that that which every one thinks really is so; and the man who attacks this belief will hardly have anything more credible to maintain instead."
Aristotle is addressing critics who argue that just because everyone or everything aims at something, it doesn't necessarily mean that the goal is "good." He dismisses such objections, saying they’re essentially absurd or baseless. His reasoning is that if everyone—both rational beings and irrational creatures—pursues something, it must correspond to something real and true. In other words, there’s a deep connection between what is universally pursued and what is genuinely good. He adds that anyone who tries to challenge this common belief will struggle to propose an alternative idea that’s more convincing or credible. Essentially, Aristotle is reinforcing the idea that universal desires point to a fundamental truth about goodness.
"If it is senseless creatures that desire the things in question, there might be something in what they say; but if intelligent creatures do so as well, what sense can there be in this view?"
Aristotle is making the point that if beings without reasoning ability (like animals or "senseless creatures") desire something, it might not necessarily prove that the thing they desire is inherently good—because their desires are more instinctual or basic. However, if intelligent beings (those who can think and reason) also desire the same thing, then it becomes much harder to dismiss the idea that the object of their desire has some kind of genuine value or goodness. In essence, Aristotle is appealing to the reasoning power of humans and the agreement between instinctual and rational desires as evidence that certain things—like pleasure—might truly be connected to the "good."
"But perhaps even in inferior creatures there is some natural good stronger than themselves which aims at their proper good."
Aristotle is suggesting here that even in the case of less rational or "inferior" creatures—such as animals or other beings considered lower in the hierarchy of life—there might still exist a kind of inherent or natural "good" that directs them toward what is best for them. This "natural good" would be something beyond their control or conscious choice, yet it leads them to whatever helps them thrive or fulfill their purpose.
In essence, he's pointing to the idea that there is some universal principle or force that drives all living beings, no matter how simple, toward what is naturally beneficial for them. This reinforces his broader argument—that the concept of "good" is tied to what all things naturally aim for and that this striving must have a foundation in something real and purposeful. Even the behavior of non-rational creatures, then, reflects the idea of moving toward some form of "goodness."