Book 10 / Chapter 2
Paragraph 1 - Eudoxus and the Nature of Pleasure as the Chief Good
Explanation - Part By Part
"Eudoxus thought pleasure was the good because he saw all things, both rational and irrational, aiming at it, and because in all things that which is the object of choice is what is excellent, and that which is most the object of choice the greatest good; thus the fact that all things moved towards the same object indicated that this was for all things the chief good (for each thing, he argued, finds its own good, as it finds its own nourishment); and that which is good for all things and at which all aim was the good."
Eudoxus argued that pleasure is the ultimate good because everything—whether it is rational (like humans) or irrational (like animals)—naturally seeks it out. He observed that beings are drawn to things they choose as desirable or excellent, and the things most desired are considered the "greatest good." Since all things universally gravitate toward pleasure as a shared aim, Eudoxus concluded that this must make it the highest good for all existence. He likened pleasure to nourishment: just as every being seeks its appropriate sustenance for survival, every being also seeks pleasure as its ultimate fulfillment or "good."
"His arguments were credited more because of the excellence of his character than for their own sake; he was thought to be remarkably self-controlled, and therefore it was thought that he was not saying what he did say as a friend of pleasure, but that the facts really were so."
Aristotle is highlighting that Eudoxus’s arguments about pleasure being the highest good were taken seriously not just because of their logical strength, but because of Eudoxus's personal reputation. People respected his moral character, particularly his self-control, and this gave credibility to his claims. In other words, Eudoxus wasn’t seen as someone who chased pleasure irresponsibly or out of selfishness—this would have made his arguments suspect. Instead, his disciplined and virtuous nature led others to believe that his defense of pleasure came from an objective examination of reality, not from personal indulgence or bias.
"He believed that the same conclusion followed no less plainly from a study of the contrary of pleasure; pain was in itself an object of aversion to all things, and therefore its contrary must be similarly an object of choice."
Eudoxus argued that just as pain is something universally avoided and regarded as undesirable by all creatures, its opposite—pleasure—must naturally hold the opposite status: something universally sought after and desirable. In other words, if everyone instinctively rejects pain as something bad, it logically follows that pleasure, being its contrary, must be inherently good and worth choosing. His reasoning builds on the idea that our natural inclinations toward or away from certain experiences reveal fundamental truths about what is good for us.
"And again that is most an object of choice which we choose not because or for the sake of something else, and pleasure is admittedly of this nature; for no one asks to what end he is pleased, thus implying that pleasure is in itself an object of choice."
Aristotle is referring to one of Eudoxus's arguments in favor of pleasure being the ultimate good. The reasoning goes like this: the things we choose purely for their own sake, without seeking some further goal or benefit from them, are considered the most desirable or valuable. Pleasure fits this description because when people experience pleasure, they do not typically question why they are enjoying it or what purpose it serves. They simply value it as it is. This implies that pleasure has an intrinsic worth, making it something that people view as a fundamental and natural aim in itself.
"Further, he argued that pleasure when added to any good, e.g. to just or temperate action, makes it more worthy of choice, and that it is only by itself that the good can be increased."
Eudoxus is making the point here that pleasure has a unique quality: when you combine it with something inherently good, such as a just or temperate (self-controlled) action, it enhances that good thing, making it even more desirable. Essentially, the addition of pleasure increases the value of good actions. This, he argues, shows that pleasure itself must be fundamentally good, because only something inherently good has the power to elevate another good thing like that. It's like saying, "If adding this ingredient always makes the recipe better, then this ingredient must be excellent on its own."