Book 1 / Chapter 6
Paragraph 3 - The Nature of Goods in Themselves and by Relation to Others
Explanation - Part By Part
"But let us discuss these matters elsewhere; an objection to what we have said, however, may be discerned in the fact that the Platonists have not been speaking about all goods, and that the goods that are pursued and loved for themselves are called good by reference to a single Form, while those which tend to produce or to preserve these somehow or to prevent their contraries are called so by reference to these, and in a secondary sense."
Here, Aristotle is pointing out an issue with the Platonists' perspective on the concept of "good." According to Plato's philosophy, there is a single, overarching Form of the Good, which unites all good things under one idea. However, Aristotle identifies a potential flaw: the Platonists seem to distinguish between two types of goods.
The first type of goods are those that are valued and pursued for their own sake—things like happiness, knowledge, or virtue. These are considered "good" simply by their very nature. The second type of goods includes things that are not valuable on their own, but are "good" because they help bring about or support the first type of goods. For instance, wealth or health might be called "good" because they help us achieve happiness or live virtuous lives. However, these are good in a secondary or instrumental sense.
Aristotle is signaling here that the Platonists' theory may not actually address all kinds of "goods" adequately, and that their concept of a single Form of the Good might not account for the different ways something can be considered "good."
"Clearly, then, goods must be spoken of in two ways, and some must be good in themselves, the others by reason of these."
Aristotle is emphasizing that not all things we consider "good" are good in the same way. He proposes that there are two categories of "goods":
1. Goods that are inherently good in themselves: These are things valued for their own sake, without needing any further justification or purpose. Examples would be things like wisdom, happiness, or virtue—things we strive for because they are intrinsically fulfilling or worthwhile.
2. Goods that are good because of their connection to the first category: These are things that are not sought for their own sake but because they serve a purpose, such as tools, money, or actions that preserve or lead to the inherently good things. These are considered "instrumental goods," meaning their value comes from their usefulness in achieving or preserving the things that are good in themselves.
By dividing "goods" this way, Aristotle is setting up a framework to distinguish between what we desire for its own value and what we desire as a means to an end.
"Let us separate, then, things good in themselves from things useful, and consider whether the former are called good by reference to a single Idea."
Aristotle is suggesting that we need to distinguish between two types of "goods." First, there are things that are good in themselves—things we pursue for their own sake, simply because they are inherently valuable or desirable (like happiness, wisdom, or honor). Second, there are things that are useful—things we value primarily for what they help us achieve or preserve (like money or tools). He then poses the question: Are the things that are good in themselves connected by one overarching, universal "Idea" of the Good? In other words, is there some single essence or concept that ties together all these inherently good things?
"What sort of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those that are pursued even when isolated from others, such as intelligence, sight, and certain pleasures and honours? Certainly, if we pursue these also for the sake of something else, yet one would place them among things good in themselves."
In this part, Aristotle is examining what kinds of things we might call "good in themselves"—in other words, things that are inherently valuable, rather than valuable because of what they lead to or produce. He suggests that such goods could include things like intelligence, sight, certain pleasures, or honors. These are things that we might choose to pursue or value even if they were completely independent of any further benefit they might bring us.
At the same time, he acknowledges that we often also pursue these same goods for the sake of something else (e.g., we might value sight because it allows us to navigate the world). Still, even if we pursue them partially for their usefulness, Aristotle argues they would still be considered inherently good—worth having or seeking for their intrinsic nature, not just their outcomes. This is part of his effort to explore whether there is a shared, overarching "goodness" in such things.
"Or is nothing other than the Idea of good good in itself? In that case the Form will be empty."
Aristotle is challenging the idea of an abstract, universal "Form" of the Good, a concept proposed by Plato. If someone claims that nothing except this abstract "Idea of the Good" can be considered truly good in itself, then this notion becomes meaningless or "empty" because it doesn't connect with any concrete, real-life examples of things that are considered good. In other words, if we ignore the actual good things we encounter—like wisdom, pleasure, or honor—and insist only on an abstract "Idea of the Good," we are left with something too vague and disconnected to serve any practical or meaningful purpose. Aristotle is emphasizing the need to ground the concept of "good" in real, tangible experiences rather than in purely abstract thinking.
"But if the things we have named are also things good in themselves, the account of the good will have to appear as something identical in them all, as that of whiteness is identical in snow and in white lead. But of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of their goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse."
Aristotle is saying that if the things we call "good in themselves" (like honor, wisdom, and pleasure) really belong to a single category of "good," then there should be some unified, consistent explanation or quality that makes them all the same kind of good. For example, we think of "whiteness" as a shared quality that exists in both snow and white lead—they are different things, but their whiteness is the same kind of whiteness.
However, when we look at honor, wisdom, and pleasure, their "goodness" doesn't seem to have a single, identical explanation. The "goodness" of wisdom is not the same as the "goodness" of pleasure or the "goodness" of honor. Each one is good for its own, distinct reasons. Therefore, Aristotle concludes, "good" isn't some unified, universal quality (as Plato's idea of a single "Form of the Good" would suggest). Instead, it manifests differently in different kinds of things.
"The good, therefore, is not some common element answering to one Idea."
Aristotle is rejecting the Platonic idea that "the good" is a single, universal concept that applies uniformly to all things considered good. Instead, he argues that goodness is not a singular, overarching essence that ties all good things together. Goodness doesn’t function like a universal property, such as "whiteness," which can be consistently recognized in things like snow or white lead. Instead, the good varies depending on the context and nature of the things we are considering—whether it’s honor, wisdom, or pleasure. These things are good in their own distinct ways, and their "goodness" cannot be reduced to a single, universal definition or form. In short, Aristotle sees "the good" as something diverse and context-dependent, not as a single common feature that applies universally.