Book 1 / Chapter 6
Paragraph 2 - The Doctrine of Ideas and the Nature of Good
Explanation - Part By Part
"The men who introduced this doctrine did not posit Ideas of classes within which they recognized priority and posteriority (which is the reason why they did not maintain the existence of an Idea embracing all numbers);"
Aristotle is critiquing the philosophers who introduced the concept of "Forms" or "Ideas," particularly Plato and his followers, for not organizing these Forms into hierarchical categories based on priority and order. For example, they didn’t establish an overarching "Form" or "Idea" that would encompass all members of a category—like creating one singular "Form" that includes all numbers. Instead, their system lacked this structure, which Aristotle sees as a limitation or inconsistency in how these abstract "Ideas" were conceived.
He’s essentially pointing out that the absence of prioritization and organization makes their theory less cohesive and less applicable across broader contexts, like the concept of "numbers" or other universal ideas. This is part of his broader critique of the universality of Plato's "Forms."
"but the term 'good' is used both in the category of substance and in that of quality and in that of relation, and that which is per se, i.e. substance, is prior in nature to the relative (for the latter is like an off shoot and accident of being); so that there could not be a common Idea set over all these goods."
Aristotle is challenging the idea of a single, universal concept of "good" that applies to everything. He points out that the word "good" is used in many different ways, depending on the context. For example, it can refer to a substance (something that exists on its own, like a person or God), a quality (such as virtues like courage or kindness), or a relation (how something is useful or beneficial in relation to something else).
He argues that things that exist "per se" (by themselves, like substances) are more fundamental than things that exist relatively (in relation to something else, like usefulness). Since the meaning of "good" depends on these very different categories, there cannot be a single, overarching idea of "good" that applies to all of them equally. It's like trying to lump together entirely different things (like virtues, usefulness, and independent existence) under one umbrella term—it's not coherent.
"Further, since 'good' has as many senses as 'being' (for it is predicated both in the category of substance, as of God and of reason, and in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e. of that which is moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the useful, and in time, i.e. of the right opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right locality and the like), clearly it cannot be something universally present in all cases and single; for then it could not have been predicated in all the categories but in one only."
Aristotle is arguing that the concept of "good" is complex and multifunctional. He points out that "good" can take on very different meanings depending on the context, just as "being" (existence) does. For example:
- In the category of substance, "good" might refer to God or reason—things seen as fundamentally important or supreme.
- In quality, it relates to virtues (like courage or kindness).
- In quantity, it refers to things that are balanced or moderate.
- In relation, it encompasses things that are useful to achieve a purpose.
- In time, it relates to the right opportunity or timing for action.
- In place, it refers to appropriateness or suitability, like being in the right location.
Because "good" fits into so many different categories and contexts, Aristotle argues that it cannot be a single, universal idea that applies equally to all these cases. A singular, all-encompassing definition of "good" would only make sense if it belonged to one single category, but clearly, it doesn’t—it’s diverse and depends on how it’s applied. This means "good" isn't a simple, one-size-fits-all concept; it's more nuanced and situation-dependent.
"Further, since of the things answering to one Idea there is one science, there would have been one science of all the goods; but as it is there are many sciences even of the things that fall under one category, e.g. of opportunity, for opportunity in war is studied by strategics and in disease by medicine, and the moderate in food is studied by medicine and in exercise by the science of gymnastics."
Aristotle is pointing out a key issue with the idea of a single, universal "good" (referred to as the "Idea of the Good" in Platonism). If there were truly one universal "Good" that applied to everything, then there should logically be one unified science or field of knowledge that studies all types of good. However, in reality, different "goods"—even within the same category—are studied by different sciences or disciplines.
For example, the concept of "opportunity" isn't something studied by a single science everywhere it appears. Instead, the idea of "opportunity" in the context of warfare is studied by military strategy, while the idea of "opportunity" in the context of illness is studied by medicine. Similarly, the notion of moderation or the "right amount" (also a type of good) is analyzed differently depending on its context: moderation in food is studied by nutrition or medicine, while moderation in physical activity falls under the field of gymnastics or exercise science.
This illustrates Aristotle's skepticism about the existence of a single, universal "Good" that applies to all things. He argues that the idea of "good" is context-dependent and varies across situations and disciplines, making it impractical to lump all these diverse "goods" together under one universal concept. Instead, "good" must be understood in its specific, practical applications.
"And one might ask the question, what in the world they mean by 'a thing itself', is (as is the case) in 'man himself' and in a particular man the account of man is one and the same. For in so far as they are man, they will in no respect differ; and if this is so, neither will 'good itself' and particular goods, in so far as they are good."
Aristotle is raising a critical question here: What exactly do people mean by claiming there is such a thing as "a thing itself," or an abstract universal form of something? He uses the example of "man" to illustrate his point. If you talk about "man himself" (a universal idea of humanity) and compare it to an individual person, the essence or definition of being "man" does not change between the two. In other words, both examples share the same "account" or nature of what "man" fundamentally is—there’s no difference.
He then applies this reasoning to the concept of "good." If "good itself" (the universal idea of goodness) and individual good things (like a virtuous act or a useful tool) are all good in the same respect, there doesn’t seem to be a meaningful distinction between the universal concept and its individual applications. They’re essentially the same in their "goodness." This challenges the notion that there’s a separate, abstract "form" of goodness that exists independently of good things in the world.
"But again it will not be good any the more for being eternal, since that which lasts long is no whiter than that which perishes in a day."
In this part, Aristotle points out that just because something is eternal—or lasts forever—it doesn’t necessarily make it "better" or more "good." He uses the example of whiteness to illustrate his point: something that lasts a long time isn’t any "whiter" than something that’s temporary and lasts only for a short time. The key idea is that the quality of a thing (like goodness or whiteness) isn’t inherently tied to how long it exists. Longevity doesn’t automatically elevate the essence or value of something.
"The Pythagoreans seem to give a more plausible account of the good, when they place the one in the column of goods; and it is they that Speusippus seems to have followed."
Aristotle is referencing the Pythagoreans, an ancient school of thought that associated the concept of "the One" with goodness. In their view, "the One" symbolized unity, harmony, and order, which they saw as essential aspects of what is good. By placing "the One" in their framework of values, they tied goodness to mathematical and metaphysical principles of unity and coherence.
Aristotle acknowledges that this perspective seems more reasonable compared to the abstract "Idea of the Good" proposed by Plato and his followers. He also notes that Speusippus, Plato's successor as head of the Academy, likely adopted this Pythagorean interpretation. This reference is significant because Aristotle is using it to critique the overly abstract way Plato and his followers framed the concept of "the Good." By highlighting the Pythagorean approach, Aristotle is pointing out that goodness might need to be understood in a more structured, practical, or concrete way, rather than as an all-encompassing, universal "Form."