Book 9 / Chapter 5

Paragraph 2 - Goodwill as the Beginning of Friendship

Explanation - Part By Part

Part 1
Original Text:

"Goodwill seems, then, to be a beginning of friendship, as the pleasure of the eye is the beginning of love. For no one loves if he has not first been delighted by the form of the beloved, but he who delights in the form of another does not, for all that, love him, but only does so when he also longs for him when absent and craves for his presence; so too it is not possible for people to be friends if they have not come to feel goodwill for each other, but those who feel goodwill are not for all that friends; for they only wish well to those for whom they feel goodwill, and would not do anything with them nor take trouble for them."

Aristotle is explaining the relationship between goodwill and friendship, drawing a comparison to love. He argues that goodwill is like the first step toward friendship, just as finding someone's appearance pleasing is the first step toward love. However, these initial feelings—whether it's goodwill or attraction—are not sufficient on their own to establish something deeper.

For example, when Aristotle says that "no one loves if he has not first been delighted by the form of the beloved," he means that love typically begins with admiration or attraction to someone's qualities (in this case, their physical form). But admiration alone does not become love until it grows into a stronger emotional connection—such as longing for someone's presence or missing them when they're away.

Similarly, goodwill only transitions into friendship when it evolves beyond this initial, surface-level feeling. Goodwill involves wishing well for someone, but it doesn't yet include the actions, sacrifices, or shared experiences that define true friendship. People who feel goodwill toward one another may think positively about each other, but they’re not yet invested enough to "take trouble for them"—in other words, to actively care for and engage in their lives.

In sum, he’s stressing that goodwill is a necessary foundation for friendship, but by itself, it is not enough to form the deep bonds that true friendship entails. It’s essentially a passive, preliminary stage of connection.

Part 2
Original Text:

"And so one might by an extension of the term friendship say that goodwill is inactive friendship, though when it is prolonged and reaches the point of intimacy it becomes friendship-not the friendship based on utility nor that based on pleasure; for goodwill too does not arise on those terms."

In this part, Aristotle is exploring the nature of goodwill and how it relates to friendship. He suggests that goodwill can be seen as a sort of "inactive friendship." What he means is that goodwill is like the foundation or starting point of friendship, but it doesn't yet have the depth or engagement that true friendship requires. It’s passive—it doesn’t involve action or close involvement with the person you feel goodwill toward.

However, Aristotle also says that if goodwill lasts over time and grows in intimacy, it can evolve into genuine friendship. Importantly, he clarifies that this kind of friendship isn't the type based on utility (where you're friends because of some practical benefit you get from each other) or pleasure (where you're friends because you simply enjoy each other's company or have fun together). Goodwill, and the friendship it may become, isn’t transactional or selfishly motivated. It’s rooted in something deeper.

Part 3
Original Text:

"The man who has received a benefit bestows goodwill in return for what has been done to him, but in doing so is only doing what is just; while he who wishes some one to prosper because he hopes for enrichment through him seems to have goodwill not to him but rather to himself, just as a man is not a friend to another if he cherishes him for the sake of some use to be made of him."

Aristotle is making an important distinction here about the nature of goodwill and its connection to self-interest and justice. When someone shows goodwill in response to a benefit they've received, they’re not necessarily doing something extraordinary; they're simply fulfilling a moral obligation or acting out of justice. For instance, if someone helps you, and you wish them well in return, it’s only fair and expected—it’s not necessarily deep or selfless.

On the other hand, Aristotle argues that if somebody wishes for someone else’s success only because they expect to benefit from it (e.g., they hope that person’s success will enrich them or give them some advantage), then their apparent goodwill isn’t truly directed toward the other person. Instead, it’s self-centered. Essentially, this isn’t genuine goodwill—it’s just self-interest disguised as goodwill.

Similarly, in the case of friendship, Aristotle suggests that you can’t call someone a genuine friend if your appreciation for them is based purely on what they can do for you (i.e., if you “cherish” them solely for their utility to you). True goodwill and true friendship cannot be transactional or selfish—they must stem from a genuine regard for the other person's character or virtues, not merely their usefulness.

Part 4
Original Text:

"In general, goodwill arises on account of some excellence and worth, when one man seems to another beautiful or brave or something of the sort, as we pointed out in the case of competitors in a contest."

Aristotle is explaining that goodwill—a positive, supportive attitude that one person might feel toward another—often arises when someone recognizes a quality of excellence or admirable virtue in another person. For example, someone might feel goodwill toward another because they find them courageous, honorable, or admirable in some way, such as their beauty, bravery, or skill. This is similar to the example of competitors in a contest: even though there may not be friendship or deep connection, there can still be a feeling of goodwill out of respect for the other person's virtues or abilities.

In essence, goodwill stems from recognizing something worthy in another person, not because of a desire to gain something in return, but rather as an appreciation of their positive qualities.