Book 8 / Chapter 13
Paragraph 3 - Types of Friendship and Justice
Explanation - Part By Part
"Now it seems that, as justice is of two kinds, one unwritten and the other legal, one kind of friendship of utility is moral and the other legal. And so complaints arise most of all when men do not dissolve the relation in the spirit of the same type of friendship in which they contracted it."
Aristotle is drawing a comparison here between justice and friendships based on utility (those that exist primarily for mutual benefit). Just as justice can be divided into two types—unwritten (moral, based on shared values or customs) and legal (outlined by formal agreements or laws)—friendships of utility can also fall into these two categories. A legal type of utility friendship is grounded in specific, clear terms, like a business agreement, while a moral type of utility friendship is more informal, based on goodwill and trust without explicit conditions.
The key issue, Aristotle points out, is that problems or complaints often arise when people end such friendships in a way that doesn’t match how they were originally formed. In other words, if a friendship was based on formal terms, dissolving it casually or unfairly (without honoring those terms) can cause friction, and vice versa. It's about maintaining consistency between the type of relationship and the expectations set from the beginning.
"The legal type is that which is on fixed terms; its purely commercial variety is on the basis of immediate payment, while the more liberal variety allows time but stipulates for a definite quid pro quo. In this variety the debt is clear and not ambiguous, but in the postponement it contains an element of friendliness; and so some states do not allow suits arising out of such agreements, but think men who have bargained on a basis of credit ought to accept the consequences."
Aristotle is discussing two types of "friendship of utility" here, specifically the legal type, which is based on clear, structured agreements. This type of interaction is less about personal bonds and more about transactional relationships, resembling contracts.
In its most straightforward form, the "commercial variety," both parties agree on immediate payment for services or goods. For example, if you buy something at a store and pay right away, it’s a simple, clear exchange.
The "more liberal variety," however, is more flexible. It allows one party to take some time before fulfilling their part of the deal but specifies an agreed-upon return (a quid pro quo). There’s still a clear structure with defined expectations, but the delay in repayment adds a small touch of trust or goodwill. This element of postponement introduces a feeling of friendliness, as it assumes the parties believe in each other’s integrity to fulfill the agreement.
Interestingly, Aristotle mentions that some states (or governing systems) discourage legal disputes arising from these credit-based agreements. The idea is that if people willingly enter into informal arrangements with delayed repayment, they should accept the risks and consequences of doing so without escalating it into a legal matter. Essentially, it's a way to encourage responsibility and trust when making such agreements, instead of relying on the legal system to sort out disputes.
"The moral type is not on fixed terms; it makes a gift, or does whatever it does, as to a friend; but one expects to receive as much or more, as having not given but lent; and if a man is worse off when the relation is dissolved than he was when it was contracted he will complain. This happens because all or most men, while they wish for what is noble, choose what is advantageous; now it is noble to do well by another without a view to repayment, but it is the receiving of benefits that is advantageous."
Aristotle is explaining a type of transactional friendship, but this one isn't governed by clear rules or agreements—it’s based on moral expectations. In these cases, someone might give something or do a favor as if they are acting out of friendship, but deep down, they are expecting the gesture to be returned, or even surpassed, in value. Essentially, it’s not truly giving—it’s more like lending, with the hope or assumption of getting something better in return.
Problems arise when the relationship ends and one party feels like they didn’t get enough out of the exchange, leaving them "worse off" than when it began. This leads to complaints or resentment.
Aristotle points out why this happens: people often aim for what’s noble (like helping selflessly) but end up choosing what’s advantageous (focused on their own gain). It’s noble to help someone without expecting anything back, but it’s advantageous to be the one receiving benefits. This tension shows how self-interest sneaks into relationships that are supposed to be based on goodwill.
"Therefore if we can we should return the equivalent of what we have received (for we must not make a man our friend against his will; we must recognize that we were mistaken at the first and took a benefit from a person we should not have taken it from-since it was not from a friend, nor from one who did it just for the sake of acting so-and we must settle up just as if we had been benefited on fixed terms). Indeed, one would agree to repay if one could (if one could not, even the giver would not have expected one to do so); therefore if it is possible we must repay."
Aristotle is emphasizing that when someone does us a favor or provides some benefit, we have a moral obligation to return something equivalent if we can. The reasoning is rooted in two principles:
1. Fairness in relationships: We shouldn’t force a sense of friendship on someone who didn’t freely choose to act out of pure goodwill or genuine affection. If someone helped us not out of true friendship but for some other reason, it’s not fair or honest to assume that they wanted to be “friends” in the deeper sense. In such cases, it’s better to treat their benefit as though it came with an obligation, like a business transaction, and repay fairly.
2. Recognizing intention: If the giver didn’t act purely out of generosity (e.g., without expecting anything in return), we might have misunderstood their intentions. In those cases, it’s only right to acknowledge the mistake by “settling the account” – repaying what we owe as if the act had been based on concrete terms, like a transactional agreement.
Aristotle also adds that if repaying isn’t feasible (for example, due to lack of resources), even the giver wouldn’t reasonably expect repayment. But if it is within our ability, repayment preserves fairness and harmony in relationships. This approach also helps clarify boundaries and avoids turning the act of receiving into a source of resentment or an imbalance in expectations.
"But at the outset we must consider the man by whom we are being benefited and on what terms he is acting, in order that we may accept the benefit on these terms, or else decline it."
Aristotle is saying that before accepting someone's help or benefit, we must carefully think about who is offering it and why they are doing so. We need to understand the terms or intentions behind their generosity. If the benefit comes with expectations (like wanting something in return later) or if their motivations don't align with what we consider fair or appropriate, it might be better to politely refuse the offer rather than accepting it and facing misunderstandings or complaints later. It's about being thoughtful and discerning with relationships of utility to avoid unnecessary complications.