Book 7 / Chapter 6
Paragraph 5 - Incontinence and Appetite
Explanation - Part By Part
"Plainly, then, the incontinence concerned with appetite is more disgraceful than that concerned with anger, and continence and incontinence are concerned with bodily appetites and pleasures; but we must grasp the differences among the latter themselves."
Aristotle is stating that being "incontinent" (lacking self-control) due to desires or appetites—for things like food, drink, or physical pleasures—is more shameful than losing control due to anger. He points out that self-control (continence) and the lack of it (incontinence) are mostly about how we handle our bodily cravings and the pleasures tied to them. However, he emphasizes that not all appetites or pleasures are the same—you need to understand the different types to fully grasp the discussion.
"For, as has been said at the beginning, some are human and natural both in kind and in magnitude, others are brutish, and others are due to organic injuries and diseases."
Aristotle is pointing out that among our desires and behaviors, there are different types with distinct origins. Some are "human and natural", meaning they align with what is typical for humans, both in their nature and in their intensity—they're reasonable and within a natural range. Others, however, are "brutish", which means they come from a more animalistic, wild side that doesn't involve reason. Lastly, some behaviors or appetites arise from organic injuries or diseases—physical or mental conditions that distort normal desires or impulses. Essentially, not all inappropriate or excessive desires come from the same place; their origins can be natural, animal-like, or pathological.
"Only with the first of these are temperance and self-indulgence concerned; this is why we call the lower animals neither temperate nor self-indulgent except by a metaphor, and only if some one race of animals exceeds another as a whole in wantonness, destructiveness, and omnivorous greed; these have no power of choice or calculation, but they are departures from the natural norm, as, among men, madmen are."
Aristotle is distinguishing between humans and animals when it comes to concepts like temperance (self-control) and self-indulgence (giving in to desires). He argues that these traits don’t really apply to animals in the way they apply to humans because animals lack choice and the ability to reason. Animals act out of instinct; they are not making conscious decisions to restrain themselves or indulge in certain actions.
However, by metaphor or comparison, we might describe a certain species of animals as particularly greedy, destructive, or excessive if they seem to exhibit these traits more than others. Even then, this is just a loose way of speaking because animals are not capable of moral decision-making—these behaviors are simply natural.
Aristotle also compares this to humans who have mental illnesses (referred to here as "madmen"). Just as animals operate outside the realm of moral reasoning, so too do people who are mentally incapacitated—they deviate from the "natural norm" of human rationality. This deviation isn’t about moral failure (as it would be for a rational person who chooses self-indulgence), but rather about an inability to engage in the rational processes that make concepts like temperance or self-indulgence meaningful.
"Now brutishness is a less evil than vice, though more alarming; for it is not that the better part has been perverted, as in man,-they have no better part. Thus it is like comparing a lifeless thing with a living in respect of badness; for the badness of that which has no originative source of movement is always less hurtful, and reason is an originative source."
Aristotle is making a comparison between "brutishness" (animalistic or instinctual behavior) and "vice" (deliberate moral corruption in humans). He argues that brutishness is less of an evil than vice, even though it can seem more shocking or alarming. This is because brutishness doesn't involve a distortion of reason or higher faculties—it simply lacks those higher faculties altogether. Animals act out of instinct, not reason, so their actions, while potentially destructive, are not a product of deliberate, conscious choice.
On the other hand, humans possess reason and the capacity for moral reflection. When a human gives in to vice, this involves a corruption of their better nature—it's like taking something that could have been virtuous or rational and twisting it into something harmful. Because vice arises from the misuse of reason, it is uniquely dangerous, as reason is a powerful force that can amplify harm.
To illustrate the difference, he likens brutishness to a "lifeless thing" and vice to something "living." A lifeless thing may cause damage, but it’s inert—it lacks the ability to actively choose or cause harm on the same scale as a being driven by reason that has been turned toward evil.
In essence, while brutishness might seem wilder or more chaotic, vice is ultimately worse because it corrupts what makes humans human—their reason and moral judgment.
"Thus it is like comparing injustice in the abstract with an unjust man. Each is in some sense worse; for a bad man will do ten thousand times as much evil as a brute."
Aristotle is making a distinction between abstract injustice and the actions of an unjust person. Injustice "in the abstract" is more like a concept or a general principle—it exists as an idea or potential wrong. But when you compare this to an actual unjust person, that individual is far more dangerous and harmful because they act on injustice with deliberate intent, choice, and reasoning.
He emphasizes that a person with reason who chooses to do wrong (e.g., a bad or immoral human) can create vastly more harm than a brute animal or something acting without thought or awareness. Why? Because humans have a greater capacity for impact—our reasoning and decision-making enable us to commit layered, calculated harms, whereas a brute or someone completely irrational lacks this purposeful drive for destruction. The unjust man's ability to spread harm on such a massive scale makes their actions far more devastating.
It's about the scale and conscious intent behind the harm: an abstract concept or irrational brute might be bad, but a reasoning human’s deliberate evil is far worse.