Book 7 / Chapter 5
Paragraph 3 - Brutish and Morbid Incontinence
Explanation - Part By Part
"Now those in whom nature is the cause of such a state no one would call incontinent, any more than one would apply the epithet to women because of the passive part they play in copulation; nor would one apply it to those who are in a morbid condition as a result of habit."
Aristotle is distinguishing here between different kinds of behaviors or conditions that might seem similar at first glance but are fundamentally different based on their cause. Specifically, he argues that if a person's state or behavior arises naturally (e.g., something inherent in their nature), it should not be called "incontinence" (the inability to control one's desires). For example, just as we wouldn't label women "incontinent" simply because of their passive role in reproduction (it’s a natural aspect of their role in the biological process), we also wouldn’t call someone incontinent if their behavior stems from a morbid condition brought about by habit or illness rather than choices they make.
The emphasis here is on the idea that true "incontinence," in Aristotle's framework, involves a failure of self-control over desires or impulses that a person could otherwise regulate and overcome. It is tied to moral and voluntary weakness, not states resulting purely from nature or uncontrollable circumstances. Essentially, he is narrowing the concept of incontinence to apply only to moral failures that stem from one's choices, not conditions one cannot help.
"To have these various types of habit is beyond the limits of vice, as brutishness is too; for a man who has them to master or be mastered by them is not simple (continence or) incontinence but that which is so by analogy, as the man who is in this condition in respect of fits of anger is to be called incontinent in respect of that feeling but not incontinent simply."
In this part, Aristotle is trying to clarify that certain extreme behaviors or states, which go beyond ordinary human vices (like anger or lack of self-control), should be understood in a more specific, nuanced way. He contrasts simple "incontinence" (the inability to control one’s desires or impulses in typical human situations) with situations that are more exceptional or unusual.
For example, if someone cannot control their fits of anger, we might say they’re "incontinent with respect to anger," but not broadly "incontinent" in the usual sense. In other words, their lack of control is tied to a specific emotional or psychological issue, rather than just a general inability to act rationally or follow what they know to be right.
Aristotle is pointing out that such states are better understood through "analogy"—they are not the same as ordinary moral failings (like being overly indulgent or self-indulgent). Essentially, they don’t fit neatly into the framework of typical virtues or vices, because they are influenced by deeper, more complex causes (like extreme habits, nature, or even disease).
"For every excessive state whether of folly, of cowardice, of self-indulgence, or of bad temper, is either brutish or morbid; the man who is by nature apt to fear everything, even the squeak of a mouse, is cowardly with a brutish cowardice, while the man who feared a weasel did so in consequence of disease; and of foolish people those who by nature are thoughtless and live by their senses alone are brutish, like some races of the distant barbarians, while those who are so as a result of disease (e.g. of epilepsy) or of madness are morbid."
Aristotle is categorizing extreme negative states of character—things like being overly fearful, excessively indulgent, overly angry, or foolish—and explaining their root causes. He asserts that these excessive states fall into two categories: brutish or morbid.
- Brutish states are more fundamental and arise from something akin to animalistic or irrational tendencies. For example, someone who fears everything—the squeak of a mouse or any minor threat—has a brutish kind of cowardice. Aristotle calls out some groups of people (like distant barbarians in his time) as examples of being naturally thoughtless and dominated by base instincts, living without higher reasoning. While his view here reflects the cultural biases of his time, the point he’s making is that such behaviors seem to arise more from nature or lack of developed reasoning.
- Morbid states, on the other hand, stem from illness or an abnormal condition. For instance, someone might become overly fearful not by nature but because they suffer from a sickness or psychological condition, like madness or epilepsy. Similarly, a person might display foolishness not as a natural trait but because their mental state has been disrupted due to some physical or pathological cause.
Essentially, Aristotle is arguing that while people can display extreme negative states, the root cause matters. Brutishness is like a deeply ingrained nature, while morbidness stems from conditions that disrupt normal functioning. These are distinct from the more human, everyday vices that people develop through bad habits or choices.
"Of these characteristics it is possible to have some only at times, and not to be mastered by them. e.g. Phalaris may have restrained a desire to eat the flesh of a child or an appetite for unnatural sexual pleasure; but it is also possible to be mastered, not merely to have the feelings."
Aristotle is saying that some extreme or unnatural desires or tendencies—whether brutish (like those stemming from raw instinct) or morbid (resulting from illness or habit)—can occasionally arise in a person, but they don't necessarily overwhelm or control that person. For example, someone like Phalaris (a figure often associated with cruelty) might experience a monstrous urge, such as a desire to commit a horrifying act (e.g., cannibalism or other unnatural behaviors), but may still hold back and choose not to act on it. However, it’s also possible for a person to fully succumb to these impulses, letting them take over and dictate their behavior. In other words, there's a distinction between merely having these feelings and being dominated by them.
"Thus, as the wickedness which is on the human level is called wickedness simply, while that which is not is called wickedness not simply but with the qualification 'brutish' or 'morbid', in the same way it is plain that some incontinence is brutish and some morbid, while only that which corresponds to human self-indulgence is incontinence simply."
Aristotle is making an important distinction here about the nature of moral failings and behaviors. Essentially, he argues that there are different types of "wickedness" or "badness," and not all of them should be judged the same way.
When someone's behavior or flaw arises from their human choices and self-indulgence (like giving in to temptations for food, drink, or pleasure), Aristotle calls that "wickedness" or "incontinence" in a straightforward sense (without any qualifiers). This type of incontinence is a purely human failing—a lack of self-control in the face of desires, where someone knowingly acts against what is reasonable or virtuous.
However, there are other, more extreme or unnatural forms of bad behavior that go beyond ordinary human weakness. For example, behaviors caused by a brutish nature (like someone acting completely irrationally, like an animal) or by a disease or condition (what Aristotle calls morbid states, like madness or uncontrollable urges due to illness) are not the same as ordinary human wickedness. These are qualifiers—he calls them "brutish" or "morbid" incontinence because they're not entirely rooted in conscious choice or typical human tendencies toward self-indulgence.
In short, Aristotle is stressing that only self-indulgence on a human level (like giving in to laziness or gluttony) is "incontinence" in the strict sense. More extreme, unnatural behaviors tied to biology, disease, or madness, are a different category altogether, even though they might sometimes resemble human moral failings.