Book 7 / Chapter 4
Paragraph 5 - Appetites and Pleasures in Ethics
Explanation - Part By Part
"Now of appetites and pleasures some belong to the class of things generically noble and good-for some pleasant things are by nature worthy of choice, while others are contrary to these, and others are intermediate, to adopt our previous distinction-e.g. wealth, gain, victory, honour."
Aristotle is saying that not all appetites and pleasures are the same. Some desires and things that bring us pleasure are inherently good—by nature, they are noble and worth choosing. On the other hand, some are the opposite, meaning they are harmful or not worth pursuing. Then there are others that fall in between these two—they aren't inherently good or bad but depend on how they are pursued. He gives examples like wealth, gain, victory, and honor, which are in this intermediate category. These things can be good, but only if approached in the right way and in the right measure.
"And with reference to all objects whether of this or of the intermediate kind men are not blamed for being affected by them, for desiring and loving them, but for doing so in a certain way, i.e. for going to excess."
This part means that it's not inherently wrong or blameworthy for people to desire or feel attracted to various things, whether they are inherently good, intermediate, or even less noble. Desiring things like wealth, honor, or pleasure is natural and acceptable. What becomes problematic is how people experience or pursue these desires—specifically when they go to excess. In other words, the issue isn't the desire itself but allowing it to become excessive or out of balance.
"(This is why all those who contrary to the rule either are mastered by or pursue one of the objects which are naturally noble and good, e.g. those who busy themselves more than they ought about honour or about children and parents, (are not wicked); for these too are good, and those who busy themselves about them are praised; but yet there is an excess even in them-if like Niobe one were to fight even against the gods, or were to be as much devoted to one's father as Satyrus nicknamed 'the filial', who was thought to be very silly on this point.)"
Aristotle is saying that some pursuits or values, like honor, caring for children, or devotion to parents, are naturally good—they are noble and praiseworthy by their very nature. If someone focuses on these things, society generally approves and praises them. However, even when dealing with these "good" things, excess can still be problematic.
He illustrates this point with examples: Niobe, from Greek mythology, is someone who loved her children so much that she defied the gods, which ended catastrophically. Similarly, Satyrus, nicknamed "the filial," was so excessively devoted to his father that he was considered foolish or silly. These examples underscore how even positive qualities (like familial devotion or love for honor) can become flawed if taken to an extreme where balance is lost.
In short, being "too much" of something good, even if it’s noble in principle, can lead to harm or become a fault, because it goes beyond what is reasonable or appropriate.
"There is no wickedness, then, with regard to these objects, for the reason named, viz. because each of them is by nature a thing worthy of choice for its own sake; yet excesses in respect of them are bad and to be avoided."
Aristotle is explaining that certain things, like honor, love for family, or wealth, are inherently good or noble and are naturally worth pursuing for their own sake. However, even with these good things, there can be too much—an excess—which turns something positive into something harmful or undesirable. While seeking these things isn't inherently wrong, overindulging in them or pursuing them excessively is a bad thing and should be avoided. In essence, balance is key, even when it comes to pursuing what is good.
"Similarly there is no incontinence with regard to them; for incontinence is not only to be avoided but is also a thing worthy of blame; but owing to a similarity in the state of feeling people apply the name incontinence, adding in each case what it is in respect of, as we may describe as a bad doctor or a bad actor one whom we should not call bad, simply."
Aristotle is making a nuanced point about how we use the term "incontinence" (lack of self-control). He explains that "incontinence" is something blameworthy because it involves giving in to desires or impulses when we shouldn’t. However, people tend to use the term loosely or metaphorically, applying it to various scenarios where it doesn’t strictly belong. For instance, he compares this to calling someone a "bad doctor" or "bad actor." These terms don't mean the person is just simply bad in a moral sense—it’s context-specific. Likewise, when people say someone is "incontinent" about things like anger, honor, or wealth, they are using the term in a more figurative sense because the core idea of true incontinence applies only to certain kinds of moral weaknesses, especially those involving physical pleasures like food, drink, and sex.
"As, then, in this case we do not apply the term without qualification because each of these conditions is no shadness but only analogous to it, so it is clear that in the other case also that alone must be taken to be incontinence and continence which is concerned with the same objects as temperance and self-indulgence, but we apply the term to anger by virtue of a resemblance; and this is why we say with a qualification 'incontinent in respect of anger' as we say 'incontinent in respect of honour, or of gain'."
Aristotle is making a careful distinction here about how we use the term "incontinence" (or lack of self-control). He argues that the concept of incontinence should primarily focus on the same things as temperance (self-restraint) and self-indulgence—those being pleasures and desires, especially bodily or sensual ones. For example, if someone lacks self-control with food, drink, or sex, this fits directly into the idea of incontinence tied to temperance.
However, people often use the term "incontinence" in a broader, more metaphorical way to describe a lack of self-control in other areas, like anger or ambition (e.g., excessive pursuit of honor or wealth). When they do this, Aristotle says they're not really talking about "incontinence" in its strict sense but something that resembles it. That’s why we qualify these instances—saying someone is “incontinent with respect to anger” or “incontinent with respect to gain.”
In short: true incontinence relates to physical pleasures, while other uses of the term (like for anger or ambition) are just comparisons or analogies because they share a similar sense of excess or lack of balance.