Book 7 / Chapter 2
Paragraph 6 - The Nature of Incontinence
Explanation - Part By Part
"Further, if incontinence and continence are concerned with any and every kind of object, who is it that is incontinent in the unqualified sense?"
Aristotle is asking a key philosophical question here: if being "incontinent" (lacking self-control) can apply to all kinds of things—such as desires for food, drink, wealth, or even honor—then who exactly deserves to be labeled "incontinent" in a general or absolute way, rather than in relation to one specific desire? He's grappling with how to define the concept of incontinence broadly, as opposed to just saying someone is "incontinent" when it comes to specific behaviors or temptations. In simpler terms, he’s asking whether there’s a universal, overarching form of incontinence that applies to certain people, or if this quality always depends on the type of desire in question.
"No one has all the forms of incontinence, but we say some people are incontinent without qualification."
Aristotle is making a distinction here between different types or forms of "incontinence" (which, in this context, refers to a lack of self-control or the inability to resist certain impulses). He notes that while no one person struggles with self-control in every possible aspect of life—for example, someone might lack self-control with food but not with anger—there are still individuals we categorize broadly as "incontinent" or lacking self-control in general.
This suggests that some forms of incontinence are more significant or prominent than others, and people who struggle in more central or defining areas of life are labeled "incontinent" without further qualification. It may also imply that the label depends on what aspects of self-control society considers most important.