Book 7 / Chapter 2
Paragraph 1 - The Paradox of Incontinence and Knowledge
Explanation - Part By Part
"Now we may ask (1) how a man who judges rightly can behave incontinently. That he should behave so when he has knowledge, some say is impossible; for it would be strange-so Socrates thought-if when knowledge was in a man something else could master it and drag it about like a slave."
Aristotle is raising the question of how a person can act against their better judgment (being incontinent) even when they understand what is right. He starts by pointing out that some people, including Socrates, believed that this is impossible. Socrates argued that if someone truly possesses knowledge of what is good or right, nothing else—like emotions or desires—should be able to overpower that knowledge and control them, as though their knowledge is helpless or enslaved.
"For Socrates was entirely opposed to the view in question, holding that there is no such thing as incontinence; no one, he said, when he judges acts against what he judges best-people act so only by reason of ignorance."
Aristotle here references Socrates' perspective on incontinence (acting against one's better judgment). According to Socrates, incontinence doesn't actually exist in the way people commonly understand it. He claims that when someone acts contrary to what they rationally know to be the best course of action, it's not because their desires overpower their reasoning or willpower. Instead, it happens due to ignorance. In other words, if a person truly understood—deeply and fully—the right thing to do, they wouldn't act against it. For Socrates, knowledge is so powerful and central that it inherently leads to right action, and any failure to act correctly must come from misunderstanding or lack of awareness, not from emotional weakness overcoming rationality.
This idea reflects Socrates' belief in the unity of knowledge and virtue: truly knowing the good would make someone automatically act in alignment with it. However, as Aristotle points out later, this stance seems to contradict real-life observations, where people clearly do things they know are wrong, driven by desires or emotions.
"Now this view plainly contradicts the observed facts, and we must inquire about what happens to such a man; if he acts by reason of ignorance, what is the manner of his ignorance?"
Aristotle is challenging Socrates' belief that people only act against what is best because of ignorance. Socrates argued that if someone truly knows what is right, they cannot act against it—knowledge, for Socrates, is like a guiding force that is unshakable. But Aristotle points out that this idea contradicts what we actually observe in people's behavior.
He acknowledges that some people knowingly act against what they believe is the best course of action, despite being aware of it. This raises a key question: If an incontinent person (someone overcome by their desires or passions) acts as they do, knowing it's wrong, in what way is their "ignorance" operating?
In simple terms, Aristotle is questioning how we explain the conflict between what someone knows (or judges to be right) and how they actually behave. If knowledge is present, how can it lose its influence? What kind of "ignorance" takes over? This tension sets the stage for Aristotle to dig deeper into the nature of self-control, reasoning, and how moral failures occur.
"For that the man who behaves incontinently does not, before he gets into this state, think he ought to act so, is evident. But there are some who concede certain of Socrates' contentions but not others; that nothing is stronger than knowledge they admit, but not that on one acts contrary to what has seemed to him the better course, and therefore they say that the incontinent man has not knowledge when he is mastered by his pleasures, but opinion."
Aristotle is tackling an important philosophical puzzle here. He’s questioning how a person can act against their better judgment—how someone can know what the right thing to do is but still fail to do it. This is the problem of incontinence (weakness of will).
He refers back to Socrates' view. Socrates famously argued that people don’t willingly go against what they know is best. If someone acts wrongly, Socrates claimed, it’s because they are ignorant, meaning they don’t fully understand or know what’s right. According to Socrates, no one can knowingly act against true knowledge; if they know something is the best course of action, they will follow it.
However, Aristotle points out that this doesn’t align with observable reality. In real life, people often know they’re making the wrong choice but still do it. For example, someone might know eating too much junk food is unhealthy but still indulge out of sheer temptation. Aristotle is therefore skeptical of Socrates’ claim that ignorance is always the key explanation.
Now, Aristotle brings up a distinction: some thinkers argue that what weakens an incontinent person isn’t true knowledge but merely opinion. They believe knowledge is powerful and can’t be overpowered by desires—but opinions, being weaker and less certain than knowledge, can be. So when someone is overcome by their pleasures and acts against their better judgment, these thinkers say it’s not real knowledge they’re going against. Instead, they suggest that what the incontinent person possesses is merely an opinion or a weaker conviction.
In summary: for this view, the person who behaves incontinently doesn’t fail to act on deep, rational knowledge; they fail to act on something less firm—an opinion that doesn’t stand a chance against the pull of their desires.
"But if it is opinion and not knowledge, if it is not a strong conviction that resists but a weak one, as in men who hesitate, we sympathize with their failure to stand by such convictions against strong appetites; but we do not sympathize with wickedness, nor with any of the other blameworthy states."
Here, Aristotle dives into an important distinction between knowledge and opinion when it comes to someone acting against their better judgment (what we call "incontinence"). If a person only has an opinion about what they ought to do, as opposed to true, solid knowledge, their stance is weaker—like someone who is unsure, hesitant, or not firmly grounded in their decision-making. When such a person gives in to strong desires or temptations, Aristotle suggests that we may feel some understanding or sympathy for their failure. Why? Because their inner conviction wasn't particularly strong to begin with, so if they falter, it doesn’t feel like a deliberate or deeply wicked betrayal of their values.
However, this sympathetic attitude has its limits. Aristotle clarifies that while we might excuse someone whose resistance was only half-hearted, we don't extend this understanding to cases of outright wickedness. True wickedness or other blameworthy states, like extreme moral failure, don’t deserve our understanding because they reflect a deeper, deliberate rejection of virtue—not just a momentary lapse. The distinction is essentially between being weak-willed (and somewhat forgivable) versus being intentionally and fully immoral (not forgivable).
"Is it then practical wisdom whose resistance is mastered? That is the strongest of all states. But this is absurd; the same man will be at once practically wise and incontinent, but no one would say that it is the part of a practically wise man to do willingly the basest acts. Besides, it has been shown before that the man of practical wisdom is one who will act (for he is a man concerned with the individual facts) and who has the other virtues."
Aristotle is addressing a tricky question here: can a person who has "practical wisdom" (someone who knows how to make sound decisions based on real-life situations and is virtuous) act incontinently? Incontinence, as defined earlier, is when someone acts against their own better judgment due to being overpowered by emotions or desires.
He rejects this claim as absurd. Why? Because practical wisdom is the highest form of rational understanding—it’s not just knowing what is good but being able to apply it correctly in specific situations. If someone has practical wisdom, they logically have the virtues needed to act in alignment with that knowledge. It would make no sense for a person who truly has such wisdom to willingly do something base (morally low or shameful). To act incontinently would be contrary to everything that practical wisdom represents.
So, Aristotle points out that if someone is genuinely wise in a practical sense, they can't simultaneously be incontinent. Wisdom is not just theoretical knowledge; it’s tied to the ability to act on that knowledge, incorporating virtues as part of their actions.