Book 7 / Chapter 13
Paragraph 1 - The Nature of Pleasure and Pain
Explanation - Part By Part
"But further (E) it is agreed that pain is bad and to be avoided; for some pain is without qualification bad, and other pain is bad because it is in some respect an impediment to us."
Aristotle here is pointing out that pain is universally understood as something negative. He explains that certain types of pain are inherently bad—meaning they are harmful or unpleasant on their own, without needing any further reasoning. Other types of pain, even if not inherently bad, are still undesirable because they create obstacles or hold us back from achieving our goals, functioning well, or living a fulfilled life. Either way, pain is something we instinctively seek to avoid.
"Now the contrary of that which is to be avoided, qua something to be avoided and bad, is good."
Aristotle is making a logical observation here. He argues that if something is bad and should be avoided (like pain), then the opposite of that bad thing must be good. In this case, since pain is something undesirable and bad, its opposite—pleasure—must be desirable and good, at least in a general sense.
"Pleasure, then, is necessarily a good."
Aristotle is making the point that pleasure, by its very nature, is fundamentally good. Since pain is widely acknowledged to be bad and something to avoid, its opposite—pleasure—must logically be good. He implies that if we agree pain is undesirable, then we must also accept that pleasure, as the reverse of pain, holds a positive value. This doesn't mean all pleasures are equally good or beneficial, but the very concept of pleasure is tied to something good in essence. It’s a necessary conclusion based on the idea that opposites are defined in relation to one another.
"For the answer of Speusippus, that pleasure is contrary both to pain and to good, as the greater is contrary both to the less and to the equal, is not successful; since he would not say that pleasure is essentially just a species of evil."
Aristotle is responding to the philosopher Speusippus, who claimed that pleasure opposes both pain and goodness. Speusippus argued that just as something "greater" can be opposed to both "lesser" and "equal," pleasure could similarly stand in opposition to both pain (a bad thing) and goodness (a good thing).
Aristotle critiques this argument by pointing out its inconsistency. If Speusippus truly believed that pleasure opposes goodness, he would have to classify pleasure as inherently a type of evil. But Speusippus doesn’t go that far, which weakens his argument. Essentially, Aristotle is saying that viewing pleasure as being opposed to both pain and goodness doesn’t make sense if you don't also claim that pleasure itself is fundamentally bad or evil—which isn’t the case, because pleasure cannot logically belong to the same category as evil.
For Aristotle, pleasure, in its essence, is not something that opposes the idea of goodness but rather aligns with it in particular contexts. He's reinforcing the idea that pleasure, especially when understood correctly, is not to be dismissed as inherently negative or problematic.