Book 6 / Chapter 2

Paragraph 1 - The Role of Virtue and the Tripartite Soul

Explanation - Part By Part

Part 1
Original Text:

"The virtue of a thing is relative to its proper work."

Aristotle is saying that the "virtue," or excellence, of anything depends on how well it fulfills its unique purpose or function—what it’s meant to do. For example, the virtue of a knife is its ability to cut well because cutting is the knife’s proper work or function. Similarly, the virtue of different parts of the soul depends on how well they fulfill their own specific "jobs" in terms of either thinking, feeling, or acting in line with reason.

Part 2
Original Text:

"Now there are three things in the soul which control action and truth—sensation, reason, desire."

Aristotle is pointing out that there are three key components within the soul that play a role in shaping both our actions and our understanding of what is true: sensation, reason, and desire.

- Sensation refers to our ability to perceive the world around us through our senses (like seeing, hearing, etc.).
- Reason is our ability to think, analyze, and make judgments.
- Desire includes our wants, emotions, and motivations that drive us to act.

Together, these three elements influence how we live, make decisions, and engage with the world around us. Each of them plays a different role, but they all interact to shape our moral and intellectual lives.

Part 3
Original Text:

"Of these sensation originates no action; this is plain from the fact that the lower animals have sensation but no share in action."

Aristotle is making the point that not everything in the soul is directly involved in initiating action. One of these elements is sensation, which refers to your ability to perceive things through your senses (like seeing or hearing). He argues that sensation, by itself, doesn't lead to action or purposeful behavior. For proof, he points to animals: they can sense things, like seeing their surroundings or feeling heat, but they do not always act with intent or reason. In other words, while animals react to sensations, they lack deliberate, thoughtful action driven by reasoning or purpose. Sensation alone is passive—it notices things but doesn’t make choices or decisions.