Book 6 / Chapter 13
Paragraph 1 - Virtue and Practical Wisdom
Explanation - Part By Part
"We must therefore consider virtue also once more; for virtue too is similarly related; as practical wisdom is to cleverness-not the same, but like it-so is natural virtue to virtue in the strict sense."
Aristotle is drawing a comparison to clarify the relationship between natural virtue and true virtue. Just as practical wisdom is related, but not identical, to cleverness, natural virtue is related to virtue in the strict sense (or true virtue), but they are not the same.
Natural virtue refers to the raw, inherent traits or tendencies people might possess from birth, like being naturally brave, kind, or self-controlled. However, these traits, on their own, are unpolished and incomplete. True or "strict" virtue, on the other hand, involves refining these natural tendencies with reason and guidance. It’s only when natural virtue is shaped by intellect and practical wisdom that it becomes full-fledged virtue in the purest sense.
So, in this line, Aristotle is setting up the idea that virtue in its most perfect form isn't something just handed to us by nature—it requires thoughtful development and rational insight.
"For all men think that each type of character belongs to its possessors in some sense by nature; for from the very moment of birth we are just or fitted for selfcontrol or brave or have the other moral qualities; but yet we seek something else as that which is good in the strict sense-we seek for the presence of such qualities in another way."
Aristotle is exploring the idea that certain traits, such as being just, self-controlled, or brave, seem to come naturally to people. From birth, it might appear that some individuals are naturally inclined to these qualities—almost as though they are born with a moral character. However, he emphasizes that this "natural" disposition or tendency is not enough to qualify as true virtue in the deepest sense. What we genuinely seek, and what counts as virtue in the "strict" or highest sense, is not just having these qualities by happenstance or nature, but possessing them in a refined, deliberate, and developed way—aligned with reason and thoughtful intention. Essentially, it’s not enough to just have a good trait by nature; how it is cultivated and expressed matters deeply.
"For both children and brutes have the natural dispositions to these qualities, but without reason these are evidently hurtful. Only we seem to see this much, that, while one may be led astray by them, as a strong body which moves without sight may stumble badly because of its lack of sight, still, if a man once acquires reason, that makes a difference in action; and his state, while still like what it was, will then be virtue in the strict sense."
Aristotle is pointing out that certain qualities, like bravery or self-control, can exist naturally in children or even in animals (brutes). These natural dispositions are raw and unrefined, and without the guidance of reason, they can actually be harmful. For example, someone who is naturally brave but doesn’t temper that bravery with good judgment might act recklessly and get themselves into trouble—like a strong body moving blindly, stumbling because it lacks sight.
However, when someone acquires reason—the ability to think and deliberate—it transforms these natural qualities into something deeper. The qualities don’t disappear; they remain fundamentally the same, but reason gives them purpose and direction. At that stage, they become true virtues, because they are guided by rational thinking and aligned with a sense of what is good and right.
Essentially, Aristotle is emphasizing that while we might be born with certain inclinations or strengths, they only become admirable virtues when governed by reason and thoughtful consideration.
"Therefore, as in the part of us which forms opinions there are two types, cleverness and practical wisdom, so too in the moral part there are two types, natural virtue and virtue in the strict sense, and of these the latter involves practical wisdom."
Aristotle is drawing a comparison to clarify how virtues work. Just as our ability to form opinions has two levels—cleverness (a basic skill to achieve goals, good or bad) and practical wisdom (which aligns cleverness with good, ethical goals)—our moral behavior also has two levels: natural virtue and virtue in the strict sense.
- Natural virtue refers to an innate tendency to act in ways that seem virtuous (like being naturally courageous or generous), but this alone isn't enough.
- Virtue in the strict sense, however, builds on natural virtue but requires practical wisdom, a rational, thoughtful ability to guide those natural tendencies toward genuinely good and ethical outcomes.
Without practical wisdom, natural virtues might be well-intentioned but impulsive or misdirected. Practical wisdom ensures that our natural inclinations are rightly guided and shaped into true virtue.
"This is why some say that all the virtues are forms of practical wisdom, and why Socrates in one respect was on the right track while in another he went astray; in thinking that all the virtues were forms of practical wisdom he was wrong, but in saying they implied practical wisdom he was right."
Aristotle is analyzing Socrates' views on virtue and practical wisdom (phronesis). He acknowledges that Socrates got part of the idea correct but ultimately missed the full picture.
Socrates argued that all virtues—such as courage, justice, and temperance—are actually forms of practical wisdom or knowledge. Aristotle disagrees with this because he believes virtues are not just about intellect or knowing what is right; they also depend on having the right character and emotions to act accordingly. In other words, knowing what is virtuous isn't enough—you must be virtuous in your actions and motivations.
Where Socrates was correct, according to Aristotle, is in recognizing that practical wisdom is an essential part of virtue. Virtuous actions require not only good intentions or natural inclinations but also reasoning and discernment—qualities tied to practical wisdom. Practical wisdom helps guide us to act rightly and in accordance with "the right rule" (the moral standard). So, while virtues are not simply forms of practical wisdom (as Socrates thought), they cannot truly exist without it either.
"This is confirmed by the fact that even now all men, when they define virtue, after naming the state of character and its objects add 'that (state) which is in accordance with the right rule'; now the right rule is that which is in accordance with practical wisdom."
Aristotle is pointing out that when people define virtue, they don't just describe it as a particular trait or quality (such as courage, justice, or self-control). They also add that virtue must align with a "right rule"—a kind of internal guide that ensures the quality is expressed properly.
This "right rule" isn't random; it is grounded in practical wisdom (or phronesis in Greek), which is the ability to make good decisions in the complexities of real-life situations. In other words, a virtuous person isn't just someone who happens to act bravely or fairly—they act that way because their choices are guided by a deeper understanding of what is good and right in specific contexts. Virtue, then, is tied closely to this wisdom.
"All men, then, seem somehow to divine that this kind of state is virtue, viz. that which is in accordance with practical wisdom. But we must go a little further. For it is not merely the state in accordance with the right rule, but the state that implies the presence of the right rule, that is virtue; and practical wisdom is a right rule about such matters."
Aristotle is clarifying the idea of what true virtue is. Many people intuitively recognize that virtue has something to do with acting in accordance with the "right rule"—in other words, doing the right thing in the right way. However, Aristotle argues that this understanding needs refinement. Virtue is not just about following the right rule or behaving correctly. Instead, it’s about being in a state of character where a person possesses and engages with the right rule. This implies internalizing the right principles, not merely acting in line with them externally.
He connects this to practical wisdom (phronesis), which is the ability to make sound judgments and take appropriate actions in specific situations. Practical wisdom, for him, is the "right rule" that informs virtuous behavior. In simple terms: virtue isn’t just doing good things; it’s being the kind of person who knows and chooses to do good things for the right reasons.
"Socrates, then, thought the virtues were rules or rational principles (for he thought they were, all of them, forms of scientific knowledge), while we think they involve a rational principle."
Here, Aristotle is pointing out a key distinction between his view of virtue and the view held by Socrates. Socrates believed that virtues (like courage, justice, self-control, etc.) were simply forms of knowledge or rational principles—almost like scientific facts or rules you could learn. In other words, for Socrates, knowing what is right automatically translates into doing what is right. If you "know" justice, you'll act justly.
Aristotle, however, says this isn’t quite accurate. He agrees that virtues involve reason or rational principles, but they are not just intellectual knowledge. Virtues are about embodying and living according to these principles—they require the right state of character, emotional maturity, and the ability to apply practical wisdom (phronesis) in real-life situations. Knowing the "rule" isn't enough; one must internalize it and live in accordance with it, which involves practice, habit, and moral reasoning grounded in experience.
This is a subtle but important distinction: Aristotle is emphasizing that virtues are not purely about intellect but are deeply connected to action, choice, and a person's character.