Book 6 / Chapter 12
Paragraph 1 - The Utility and Role of Practical and Philosophic Wisdom
Explanation - Part By Part
"Difficulties might be raised as to the utility of these qualities of mind."
Aristotle begins this section by acknowledging that people might question the practical usefulness of the two intellectual qualities he has been discussing—philosophic wisdom (sophia) and practical wisdom (phronesis). Essentially, he is anticipating objections: why are these forms of wisdom valuable, and what is their purpose in our lives? Are they just abstract virtues, or do they truly contribute to human well-being and happiness? This sets the stage for him to examine their roles and defend their importance.
"For (1) philosophic wisdom will contemplate none of the things that will make a man happy (for it is not concerned with any coming into being), and though practical wisdom has this merit, for what purpose do we need it?"
Aristotle is questioning the usefulness of philosophic wisdom and practical wisdom. He points out that philosophic wisdom (or theoretical wisdom) doesn’t deal with the practical, everyday aspects of life or things that directly contribute to making a person happy—it focuses instead on abstract, eternal truths that don't "come into being" (meaning they aren’t tied to change or material creation). On the other hand, even though practical wisdom seems to concern itself with things tied to human happiness—like understanding what is just, noble, and good—he raises the question of why we actually need it in the first place.
"Practical wisdom is the quality of mind concerned with things just and noble and good for man, but these are the things which it is the mark of a good man to do, and we are none the more able to act for knowing them if the virtues are states of character, just as we are none the better able to act for knowing the things that are healthy and sound, in the sense not of producing but of issuing from the state of health; for we are none the more able to act for having the art of medicine or of gymnastics."
This section delves into the tension between knowing what is good (having knowledge) and actually doing what is good (taking action). Aristotle is discussing practical wisdom (the ability to make good decisions in daily life) and pointing out a potential complication: just because someone knows what is right, noble, or good doesn't mean they will necessarily act that way.
For example, you might intellectually understand what actions are healthy—such as eating well or exercising—but that understanding alone doesn't mean you will actually live a healthy lifestyle. Similarly, even though you might study medicine or fitness ("the art of medicine or of gymnastics"), possessing that knowledge won't inherently make you healthier unless you act on it.
What Aristotle is highlighting here is that virtues, like practical wisdom, are not merely about "knowing" the right things; they are about translating that knowledge into action. Without this connection to behavior, knowledge alone doesn’t necessarily make someone good or virtuous.
"But (2) if we are to say that a man should have practical wisdom not for the sake of knowing moral truths but for the sake of becoming good, practical wisdom will be of no use to those who are good; again it is of no use to those who have not virtue; for it will make no difference whether they have practical wisdom themselves or obey others who have it, and it would be enough for us to do what we do in the case of health; though we wish to become healthy, yet we do not learn the art of medicine."
Aristotle is grappling here with a potential critique of practical wisdom (phronesis). He’s asking: If the purpose of practical wisdom is to help someone become morally good, then what role does it play depending on a person's character? Here's the dilemma he's suggesting:
- If someone is already morally good, then practical wisdom doesn’t add anything new to their ability to act well. They’re already doing the right thing, so why is practical wisdom necessary?
- On the other hand, if someone lacks virtue (i.e., they aren’t yet morally good), practical wisdom also seems useless. Why? Because such a person could just follow advice or instructions from others who do have practical wisdom instead of cultivating it themselves—just like with health: if we want to become healthy, we often rely on doctors rather than learning medicine ourselves.
This is why Aristotle highlights the apparent paradox: Is practical wisdom really necessary, or is it enough to simply take direction from those who already possess it? It’s a challenge to the significance of practical wisdom, questioning its role and utility in different kinds of people.
"(3) Besides this, it would be thought strange if practical wisdom, being inferior to philosophic wisdom, is to be put in authority over it, as seems to be implied by the fact that the art which produces anything rules and issues commands about that thing."
Aristotle is raising a potential issue here: Practical wisdom (phronesis), which deals with day-to-day decisions about how to act morally and beneficially, is considered inferior to philosophic wisdom (sophia), which is focused on understanding eternal truths and the nature of reality. Yet, he points out that it would seem odd if practical wisdom were placed in a position of authority over philosophic wisdom—like a higher-ranking guide—given that philosophic wisdom is acknowledged as the more "sublime" or superior type of knowledge.
He further illustrates this by drawing an analogy: In various crafts or arts, the skill used to produce something (like the skill of a builder creating a house) is the one that gives the orders or has control over what is created. By this logic, practical wisdom, which is concerned with human action in the here and now, would seem to be in charge of the "application" of philosophic wisdom, even though the latter is theoretically loftier. This tension raises an interesting discussion about how these two types of wisdom relate to each other and whether there can or should be a hierarchy between them. It's a way of questioning whether the pursuit of practical, everyday virtue could ever guide or outrank the higher contemplation of universal truths.
"These, then, are the questions we must discuss; so far we have only stated the difficulties."
Aristotle is summarizing the challenges or problems that have been raised regarding the usefulness and purpose of philosophic wisdom (sophia) and practical wisdom (phronesis). He acknowledges that these questions and criticisms need to be explored. Up to this point, however, he has not provided answers to these issues—he has only outlined what the difficulties are. Essentially, this is the moment where he initiates a deeper investigation into whether and why these intellectual virtues truly matter for a good and fulfilling life.
"(1) Now first let us say that in themselves these states must be worthy of choice because they are the virtues of the two parts of the soul respectively, even if neither of them produce anything."
Aristotle begins by addressing the doubts about the usefulness of philosophic wisdom (sophia) and practical wisdom (phronesis). His response here is that these virtues, in and of themselves, are inherently valuable and worth choosing. Why? Because each corresponds to one of the two essential parts of the human soul. Philosophic wisdom is connected to the part of us that seeks understanding and truth (our rational, contemplative intellect), while practical wisdom is tied to the part of us that deals with action, decision-making, and living well in a human, moral sense.
Importantly, Aristotle is saying that even if these types of wisdom don't directly produce something tangible—like health, wealth, or even happiness—they're still intrinsically good. They represent the cultivation of human excellence in two crucial areas of life: thinking and acting. So, their value doesn't depend on them being useful tools for achieving something else; they are worthwhile simply because they fulfill what it means to be a virtuous human being.