Book 6 / Chapter 10
Paragraph 1 - Understanding and Practical Wisdom
Explanation - Part By Part
"Understanding, also, and goodness of understanding, in virtue of which men are said to be men of understanding or of good understanding, are neither entirely the same as opinion or scientific knowledge (for at that rate all men would have been men of understanding), nor are they one of the particular sciences, such as medicine, the science of things connected with health, or geometry, the science of spatial magnitudes."
Here, Aristotle is clarifying what "understanding" (sunesis in Greek) and "goodness of understanding" mean. He starts by saying that these qualities—what make someone a "man of understanding" or "of good understanding"—are not the same as opinion or scientific knowledge. If they were, then everyone who has opinions or knows scientific facts would automatically be considered a person of understanding, which clearly isn’t true. Aristotle points out that understanding isn’t tied to specific sciences like medicine (focused on health) or geometry (focused on spatial mathematics). In essence, he’s narrowing down the concept of understanding to something different from mere scientific expertise or personal opinions. It operates on a different level.
"For understanding is neither about things that are always and are unchangeable, nor about any and every one of the things that come into being, but about things which may become subjects of questioning and deliberation."
This part is emphasizing that "understanding" deals with things that are flexible, debatable, and open to discussion. It doesn’t concern itself with absolute truths or unchangeable facts (like those studied in mathematics or natural sciences), nor does it cover everything that exists or happens. Instead, understanding focuses on situations or issues that invite thought, analysis, and decision-making—the kind of things we might weigh and deliberate over in practical situations. It’s about grasping matters where judgment and interpretation are necessary.
"Hence it is about the same objects as practical wisdom; but understanding and practical wisdom are not the same. For practical wisdom issues commands, since its end is what ought to be done or not to be done; but understanding only judges."
Aristotle is explaining the difference between "understanding" (synesis) and "practical wisdom" (phronesis), even though they both deal with the same kinds of topics—things that are open to human decision and action. The key distinction lies in their roles:
- Practical wisdom is action-oriented; it guides what should be done or avoided. It has the power to "issue commands," meaning it doesn't just analyze or reflect—it actively determines a course of action.
- Understanding, on the other hand, is more about judgment. It evaluates and makes sense of situations, but it doesn't go as far as giving instructions on what to do next. It's more like a tool for interpreting and assessing, rather than deciding or acting.
In essence, practical wisdom decides; understanding evaluates.
"(Understanding is identical with goodness of understanding, men of understanding with men of good understanding.) Now understanding is neither the having nor the acquiring of practical wisdom; but as learning is called understanding when it means the exercise of the faculty of knowledge, so 'understanding' is applicable to the exercise of the faculty of opinion for the purpose of judging of what some one else says about matters with which practical wisdom is concerned-and of judging soundly; for 'well' and 'soundly' are the same thing."
Aristotle is distinguishing between "understanding" and "practical wisdom" while explaining their relationship. He emphasizes that understanding is not the same as possessing or acquiring practical wisdom. Instead, it relates to how a person evaluates or judges discussions or arguments about topics connected to practical wisdom. In this context, "understanding" refers to a person's ability to use their faculty of opinion to assess the merit or truth of what someone else is saying about things that require practical decision-making.
Importantly, Aristotle clarifies that understanding involves judging well or soundly. In other words, understanding isn't just about agreeing with or acknowledging an argument; it involves critically evaluating it in a thoughtful, sound, and accurate way. Essentially, "understanding" is a kind of intellectual discernment—focused on interpreting and assessing reasoning in a way that aligns with good judgment.
The phrase "understanding is identical with goodness of understanding" reinforces that true understanding isn't random or subjective; it requires a certain quality or excellence when exercising judgment in deliberative matters.
"And from this has come the use of the name 'understanding' in virtue of which men are said to be 'of good understanding', viz. from the application of the word to the grasping of scientific truth; for we often call such grasping understanding."
This part explains why we sometimes use the term "understanding" to mean a person's ability to make sense of things, especially when it comes to grasping truths, including scientific truths. Aristotle is pointing out that we refer to people as having "good understanding" when they show an ability to judge or comprehend such truths soundly and accurately. Essentially, "understanding" in this context isn't just about having knowledge but about being able to interpret and evaluate things thoughtfully and correctly. This way of thinking links understanding to a type of intellectual insight or clarity.