Book 5 / Chapter 8
Paragraph 1 - Voluntary and Involuntary Acts of Justice and Injustice
Explanation - Part By Part
"Acts just and unjust being as we have described them, a man acts unjustly or justly whenever he does such acts voluntarily; when involuntarily, he acts neither unjustly nor justly except in an incidental way; for he does things which happen to be just or unjust."
Aristotle is explaining here that for an action to truly be considered just or unjust, the person performing it must do so voluntarily. If someone performs an action involuntarily (without intention or control), their act can't fully be classified as just or unjust in a meaningful sense—though it might still appear just or unjust on the surface. In other words, the intent behind the action is critical. If the person didn’t intentionally or knowingly choose to act in a particular way, then morally speaking, their action doesn’t fully carry the weight of justice or injustice. It’s only incidental or accidental in such cases.
"Whether an act is or is not one of injustice (or of justice) is determined by its voluntariness or involuntariness; for when it is voluntary it is blamed, and at the same time is then an act of injustice; so that there will be things that are unjust but not yet acts of injustice, if voluntariness be not present as well."
Aristotle is making an important distinction here between something being unjust and it being an act of injustice. The key difference lies in whether the action is done voluntarily (on purpose, with knowledge and intent). If someone willingly and knowingly performs an unjust act, it qualifies as an act of injustice and can be blamed. However, if voluntariness is missing—meaning the person did not intend to act unjustly—then the action might still be unjust, but it won’t fully qualify as an act of injustice. In other words, intent and awareness are critical for labeling an action as truly unjust in a moral sense. Without intent, the wrongdoing is incomplete from an ethical perspective.
"By the voluntary I mean, as has been said before, any of the things in a man's own power which he does with knowledge, i.e. not in ignorance either of the person acted on or of the instrument used or of the end that will be attained (e.g. whom he is striking, with what, and to what end), each such act being done not incidentally nor under compulsion (e.g. if A takes B's hand and therewith strikes C, B does not act voluntarily; for the act was not in his own power)."
In this part, Aristotle clarifies what he means by voluntary actions, which are crucial when determining whether a person is acting justly or unjustly. He explains that for an action to be voluntary, it must satisfy certain conditions:
1. The person must have control over the action – This means that the person is making a conscious choice without external coercion. For instance, if someone forces another's hand to strike a third person (as in the example of A taking B's hand to hit C), the action isn't voluntary for B, because it wasn't in B's control.
2. The person must act with knowledge – This includes understanding:
- Who they are acting upon (e.g., they know whom they're striking);
- What they are using as a tool or means (e.g., knowing they are striking with a stick rather than their hand);
- What the purpose or outcome is (e.g., knowing whether the strike is meant to hurt, get attention, etc.).
These conditions rule out actions done:
- Out of ignorance (e.g., not knowing who the person being struck is);
- Accidentally (e.g., striking someone unintentionally);
- Under compulsion (e.g., being physically forced by another person).
The key idea here is that an action can only truly be called voluntary if it originates from the person's own deliberate decision, with full knowledge of what they are doing and why. These distinctions are important because only voluntary actions can fully carry moral weight (and therefore, be praised or blamed as just or unjust).
"The person struck may be the striker's father, and the striker may know that it is a man or one of the persons present, but not know that it is his father; a similar distinction may be made in the case of the end, and with regard to the whole action."
This part is addressing the idea that not all actions are equally voluntary, and the level of knowledge a person has about what they are doing and its consequences plays a crucial role in determining whether their action is truly voluntary—and therefore if it can be considered just or unjust. Aristotle gives an example: imagine someone strikes another person. The striker might know basic facts, like "this is a person" or "this person is physically present," but they might not realize the person they're striking is their father.
This distinction matters because knowledge deepens responsibility. Striking a random person knowingly is different, ethically speaking, from striking their father knowingly. If the striker is unaware of the relationship, their act lacks certain layers of intentionality, and this affects how blameworthy—or even "unjust"—the action is. The same kind of distinction applies not only to the people involved but also to the goal or result of the action ("the end") and the context of the action as a whole.
"Therefore that which is done in ignorance, or though not done in ignorance is not in the agent's power, or is done under compulsion, is involuntary (for many natural processes, even, we knowingly both perform and experience, none of which is either voluntary or involuntary; e.g. growing old or dying)."
Aristotle explains that actions done without full knowledge, actions forced upon someone, or actions outside a person's control are considered involuntary. For instance, we may be aware of processes like aging or dying as they happen to us, but these aren't instances of voluntary or involuntary action in the same sense because they're natural processes entirely beyond our control or choice. In other words, some things just happen to us as part of life, and they fall outside the realm of moral responsibility or decision-making.
"But in the case of unjust and just acts alike the injustice or justice may be only incidental; for a man might return a deposit unwillingly and from fear, and then he must not be said either to do what is just or to act justly, except in an incidental way."
This part is emphasizing that the moral quality of an action—that is, whether it is just or unjust—doesn’t solely depend on the external outcome of the action itself. Instead, Aristotle is focusing on the intention and motivations behind the action.
For example, if someone returns money they owe to another person, that act seems just. However, if the person returns the money unwillingly, out of fear of punishment or coercion, then their action isn’t truly just in the moral sense; they’re simply compelled to do something that resembles a just deed. Aristotle calls this justice "incidental" because the true moral weight of justice requires that the person acts willingly and knowingly. In this case, the justice of the action is just an accidental result, and not a reflection of the person’s virtuous character.
The idea here is that morality involves choice—being just involves more than simply doing the right thing; it involves wanting to do the right thing of one’s own accord.
"Similarly the man who under compulsion and unwillingly fails to return the deposit must be said to act unjustly, and to do what is unjust, only incidentally."
This part is stressing an important distinction: when someone fails to return a deposit (or fulfill an obligation) because they are forced to do so against their will, they are not acting "unjustly" in the true sense, but only in an incidental way. In other words, the failure to fulfill the obligation is still objectively an unjust act, but the person isn’t fully to blame for it because they were compelled by external circumstances. Their lack of true intent ("voluntariness") means they cannot be considered morally or personally unjust, even if the outcome of their action might still cause harm or appear as wrongdoing.
"Of voluntary acts we do some by choice, others not by choice; by choice those which we do after deliberation, not by choice those which we do without previous deliberation."
Aristotle here is distinguishing between two types of voluntary actions: those we do by choice and those we do not by choice. Actions done by choice are those we actively think through and decide on after considering our options—deliberation is involved. On the other hand, actions done not by choice are still voluntary (since we do them knowingly and willingly), but they happen more immediately, without us stopping to weigh the pros and cons or reflect beforehand. For example, deciding to help a friend with their project after thinking about how much time you can spare is an act done by choice. Meanwhile, instinctively helping a child who's about to fall without planning it out is voluntary but not by choice.
"Thus there are three kinds of injury in transactions between man and man; those done in ignorance are mistakes when the person acted on, the act, the instrument, or the end that will be attained is other than the agent supposed; the agent thought either that he was not hitting any one or that he was not hitting with this missile or not hitting this person or to this end, but a result followed other than that which he thought likely (e.g. he threw not with intent to wound but only to prick), or the person hit or the missile was other than he supposed."
Aristotle is making a distinction between different kinds of harm or "injury" that happen between people, especially when one person wrongs another. Here, he is focusing on harm caused by ignorance. Essentially, Aristotle is saying that injuries caused in ignorance are mistakes: the person who caused the harm did not intend to do it, or they misunderstood something essential about the situation.
For example:
- The person might have thought they weren’t harming anyone at all.
- They might not have known they were using a harmful tool or weapon.
- They might not have realized they were harming this particular person (e.g., mistaking someone for a stranger when it’s actually a friend).
- They might not have intended the harm to be as severe as it turned out to be (e.g., intending to lightly poke someone but actually injuring them).
In these cases, the harm results from incorrect understanding or an unexpected outcome. Aristotle is dissecting situations where the harm wasn't deliberate and showing how they differ from harm caused intentionally.
"Now when (1) the injury takes place contrary to reasonable expectation, it is a misadventure. When (2) it is not contrary to reasonable expectation, but does not imply vice, it is a mistake (for a man makes a mistake when the fault originates in him, but is the victim of accident when the origin lies outside him)."
In this part, Aristotle is trying to clarify the different ways an injury or harm can arise, depending on the circumstances and intent behind the act. Here's the breakdown:
1. Misadventure (Accident): An injury is seen as a misadventure when it happens completely unexpectedly or contrary to what anyone could reasonably foresee. It feels more like bad luck or an accident that no one could have anticipated or controlled.
2. Mistake: An injury is seen as a mistake when it’s not surprising or outside what could reasonably happen, but it also doesn't involve any moral failing or bad intention (no "vice"). Aristotle makes a distinction here: a "mistake" happens when the person causing harm is responsible due to their own error (it arises from them), but if the harm is caused by something totally external or out of their control, they’re more of a victim of circumstance than an agent of harm.
Essentially, he is carving out categories of missteps or harms based on whether they were predictable and whether they involve some fault within the person acting or purely external forces. The focus here is not just on what happened, but on how and why it happened.
"When (3) he acts with knowledge but not after deliberation, it is an act of injustice-e.g. the acts due to anger or to other passions necessary or natural to man; for when men do such harmful and mistaken acts they act unjustly, and the acts are acts of injustice, but this does not imply that the doers are unjust or wicked; for the injury is not due to vice."
In this part, Aristotle is explaining that sometimes people commit harmful or unjust acts knowingly, meaning they are aware of what they are doing, but they do so impulsively and without careful thought or planning (what he calls "deliberation"). These actions often occur when someone is overtaken by strong emotions like anger or other natural human passions.
While these acts are considered "unjust" because they cause harm or wrongdoing, Aristotle makes a key distinction: doing something unjust in this way does not necessarily mean that the person is an unjust or wicked individual. Why? Because their action didn’t stem from a deeper moral flaw or "vice"—it wasn't something they chose after reasoning or with malicious intent, but rather something done recklessly or out of emotional impulse. Essentially, it’s the difference between a bad action and a bad character.
"But when (4) a man acts from choice, he is an unjust man and a vicious man."
Aristotle is saying that when someone knowingly and deliberately chooses to commit an unjust act—when they take the time to deliberate and then intentionally decide to cause harm or do wrong—this reflects something deeper about their character. Such a person isn't just performing an unjust act; they themselves are an unjust and morally bad person. This is because their unjust actions are rooted in a conscious decision aligned with their values or lack of virtue, revealing vice (a corrupt or flawed moral character).
In essence, deliberate choice reflects who we truly are. So, when injustice is intentional and calculated, it speaks to the person's inner nature, making them not only responsible for the action but also classifiable as "unjust" or "vicious" in character.