Book 5 / Chapter 6
Paragraph 3 - Different Forms of Justice in Relationships
Explanation - Part By Part
"The justice of a master and that of a father are not the same as the justice of citizens, though they are like it; for there can be no injustice in the unqualified sense towards thing that are one's own, but a man's chattel, and his child until it reaches a certain age and sets up for itself, are as it were part of himself, and no one chooses to hurt himself (for which reason there can be no injustice towards oneself)."
Aristotle is discussing different kinds of justice and emphasizing that the justice observed in relationships like that of a master to a servant or a father to a child is not the same as the justice shared among citizens in a political community. He argues that, in these "private" relationships (like with one's children or possessions), full justice does not apply because these things, to an extent, are seen as extensions of the individual.
For example, Aristotle views children (until they are old enough to act independently) and possessions (like property or tools) as being almost a part of the person who owns or governs them. He then ties this idea to the belief that no one deliberately harms themselves—therefore, he suggests, there can’t truly be injustice in a strict sense when dealing with what one perceives as part of themselves.
This reflects the cultural perspective of Aristotle’s time, where hierarchical relationships (father-child, master-servant) were often seen differently than the more "equal" relationships between citizens of a political society. In short, Aristotle is saying that justice between citizens is "political," because it's based on equality and shared governance, while justice within a household or family operates under a different framework.
"Therefore the justice or injustice of citizens is not manifested in these relations; for it was as we saw according to law, and between people naturally subject to law, and these as we saw' are people who have an equal share in ruling and being ruled."
Aristotle is pointing out that the concept of justice is different depending on the types of relationships involved. Specifically, he's saying that the kind of justice that applies between citizens doesn't apply in relationships where the parties are not equal in status or power. Political justice—justice between citizens—is based on the idea of equality, where people mutually share responsibility for both ruling and being ruled. This kind of justice comes into play when people are subject to the same laws and exist on relatively equal footing within a community.
In relationships where this mutual equality and shared participation under law don't exist (like a parent-child relationship or a master-servant relationship), political justice isn't applicable. Instead, what's seen as "just" in these situations operates differently, depending more on the inherent hierarchy or nature of those relationships.
"Hence justice can more truly be manifested towards a wife than towards children and chattels, for the former is household justice; but even this is different from political justice."
Aristotle is explaining that the notion of justice varies depending on the relationships involved. He argues that justice between a husband and wife—what he calls household justice—is closer to political justice than the justice between a person and their children or property (referred to here as "chattels"). However, Aristotle explicitly emphasizes that even the justice within a household, such as between spouses, is fundamentally different from political justice.
The key distinction lies in equality and the nature of the relationship. Political justice applies among citizens, who are considered equals and share in ruling and being ruled by laws. In contrast, within a household, relationships often involve natural hierarchies or differing levels of dependence (e.g., between parents and children), and the justice required there is shaped by these dynamics. So, the justice between a husband and wife may be more mutual, but it still does not fully resemble the equality-based justice seen in a political context.