Book 5 / Chapter 2
Paragraph 2 - The Nature of Injustice in the Context of Wickedness
Explanation - Part By Part
"That there is such a thing is indicated by the fact that while the man who exhibits in action the other forms of wickedness acts wrongly indeed, but not graspingly (e.g. the man who throws away his shield through cowardice or speaks harshly through bad temper or fails to help a friend with money through meanness), when a man acts graspingly he often exhibits none of these vices,-no, nor all together, but certainly wickedness of some kind (for we blame him) and injustice."
Aristotle is explaining that there is a specific kind of wrongdoing or wickedness, distinct from other types of bad behavior, tied to being grasping or excessively selfish. For instance, someone who dumps their shield in battle out of fear (cowardice), snaps at others out of a hot temper, or refuses to help a friend financially out of stinginess, is definitely doing something wrong—but their wrongdoing doesn't stem from being grasping or trying to unfairly take something for themselves.
However, when someone acts in a grasping way (seeking personal gain, often at the expense of others), they might not display any of these specific vices like cowardice, temper, or meanness. Despite this, we still consider their behavior blameworthy and label it as unjust. This suggests that grasping behavior represents a different category of wickedness tied to injustice, separate from these other flaws.
"There is, then, another kind of injustice which is a part of injustice in the wide sense, and a use of the word 'unjust' which answers to a part of what is unjust in the wide sense of 'contrary to the law'."
Aristotle is explaining that there is a specific type of injustice that is distinct from the broader idea of "injustice" as simply being "against the law" or morally wrong in a general sense. This more specific kind of injustice relates to situations where someone unfairly seeks personal gain—often in relation to things like money, honor, or safety—at the expense of others. It’s more narrow and focused, but still falls under the umbrella of injustice as a moral wrong. This distinction between broad and specific types of injustice is important for understanding how unjust actions are categorized and judged.
"Again if one man commits adultery for the sake of gain and makes money by it, while another does so at the bidding of appetite though he loses money and is penalized for it, the latter would be held to be self-indulgent rather than grasping, but the former is unjust, but not self-indulgent; evidently, therefore, he is unjust by reason of his making gain by his act."
Aristotle is distinguishing between two motivations behind the same wrongful act to highlight different kinds of wrongdoing. He uses adultery as an example:
- If someone commits adultery for the sake of financial gain (say, they profit from their action), their wrongdoing isn’t primarily about uncontrolled desire or indulgence. Instead, it's about injustice, because they’re motivated by greed or a desire for gain at someone else's expense.
- On the other hand, if someone commits adultery because of uncontrollable desires or appetites—even if it costs them money or brings punishment—they aren’t acting out of greed or grasping behavior. Instead, they’re being self-indulgent, ruled by their passions rather than rationality.
The key point here is that Aristotle differentiates between two types of moral failings: one driven by greed (injustice tied to gain) and the other by lack of self-control (self-indulgence). Both are blameworthy, but they stem from different causes. This distinction helps him build his broader argument about different kinds of justice and moral failings.
"Again, all other unjust acts are ascribed invariably to some particular kind of wickedness, e.g. adultery to self-indulgence, the desertion of a comrade in battle to cowardice, physical violence to anger; but if a man makes gain, his action is ascribed to no form of wickedness but injustice."
Aristotle is pointing out that most unjust actions can usually be traced back to a specific character flaw or vice. For instance, committing adultery comes from being self-indulgent, abandoning a comrade in battle arises from cowardice, and acts of physical violence stem from anger. These actions are wrong, but they are tied to a clear moral failing.
However, Aristotle observes something distinct about actions motivated by gain—for instance, financial or material profit. When someone acts unjustly with the aim of gaining something, we don’t link their action to any of these specific vices like self-indulgence, cowardice, or anger. Instead, we directly call it injustice. This highlights the unique nature of unjust acts motivated by greed or desire for profit. Thus, injustice driven by gain doesn’t neatly fit into the categories of other moral flaws but stands apart.
"Evidently, therefore, there is apart from injustice in the wide sense another, 'particular', injustice which shares the name and nature of the first, because its definition falls within the same genus; for the significance of both consists in a relation to one's neighbour, but the one is concerned with honour or money or safety-or that which includes all these, if we had a single name for it-and its motive is the pleasure that arises from gain; while the other is concerned with all the objects with which the good man is concerned."
Aristotle is explaining that "injustice" can be understood in more than one way. There is the broad, general sense of injustice, which goes against the law or moral principles, but there is also a more specific type of injustice that focuses on particular things—like unfair behavior related to honor, money, safety, or similar matters. This specific kind of injustice is motivated by gaining something—essentially by benefiting at someone else's expense.
Both forms of injustice relate to how people treat others (a relationship to one's neighbor), but they differ in focus. The specific injustice is tied to greed or self-interest in tangible gains, while the broader concept applies to a wider range of moral or virtuous concerns that a good person would consider, like cowardice or selfishness beyond material things. In sum, Aristotle is highlighting that injustice is not a single concept but has layers, and this particular kind deals primarily with issues of taking or gaining at someone else's loss.
"It is clear, then, that there is more than one kind of justice, and that there is one which is distinct from virtue entire; we must try to grasp its genus and differentia."
Aristotle is concluding that justice is not just one unified concept but instead has multiple forms. One kind of justice is part of virtue as a whole (encompassing every aspect of moral goodness), but there is another, more specific type of justice that stands apart from this all-encompassing virtue. This "particular" justice focuses on fairness in specific contexts—like money, honor, or safety—rather than the broader idea of virtue, which includes all aspects of being a good person. Aristotle is signaling the need to understand this specific type of justice by identifying what category (genus) it belongs to and how it is distinct (differentia) from other forms of justice. In essence, he’s preparing to analyze justice more precisely by breaking it down into its smaller parts.