ETHICS

Here, Aristotle draws a comparison between two pairs of virtues to explain the concept of balance in different aspects of life. He is relating the virtue of pride (which deals with striving for great honor) to another, lesser but still significant, virtue in the sphere of honor. This lesser virtue, he suggests, is to pride as liberality is to magnificence.

In previous discussions, Aristotle described magnificence as dealing with large-scale matters—like grand expenditures for public works or noble causes—while liberality addresses moderate, everyday dealings with wealth, such as giving and receiving appropriately. Similarly, he’s suggesting here that pride operates on the "grand scale" of honor, where individuals strive for recognition in big, noble ways. But there’s a humbler, more moderate virtue associated with honor that applies to smaller, everyday situations, just like liberality does in the realm of wealth.

This setup introduces the idea of finding balance—not all pursuits of honor should involve grandeur, just as not all interactions with wealth should require extravagance.

Aristotle is explaining here that there is a balance (or "mean") when it comes to seeking honor, just as there is in matters like wealth. While pride, discussed earlier, deals with grand honors, Aristotle now shifts focus to more everyday or "middling" honors. He says that a person can seek honor in three ways: too much (excess), too little (deficiency), or in the right amount and from the right sources (the virtuous mean). The idea is that honor, like other aspects of life, has a proper measure—it should be pursued neither excessively nor negligently but with moderation and in alignment with what is truly appropriate.

Aristotle is explaining that both extremes in the pursuit of honor can be problematic. The overly ambitious person seeks honor excessively, often from inappropriate or unworthy sources, which can lead to actions motivated by vanity rather than virtue. On the other hand, the unambitious person avoids seeking honor altogether, even when it would be justified or noble to do so—such as for truly virtuous actions. In both cases, there is an imbalance because neither individual's attitude towards honor aligns with what is appropriate or virtuous.

In this part, Aristotle highlights a nuanced perspective on ambition and its opposite, unambitiousness. He points out that people sometimes praise both traits, but for different reasons. A person who is ambitious might be admired for their courage and their pursuit of noble, honorable goals—qualities that can reflect strength and an active desire to achieve greatness. On the other hand, someone who is unambitious might be praised for their moderation and self-restraint, showing that they have control over their desires and do not obsessively chase after recognition or honor.

The key idea here is that both ambition and unambitiousness can have a positive side, depending on the context and the balance demonstrated by the individual. However, as Aristotle will later argue, the ideal lies in finding the proper balance or "mean" that avoids the extremes of excess ambition or complete lack of it.

Aristotle is pointing out that the concept of "ambition" or "love of honour" is interpreted differently depending on context. When someone cares about honour more than the average person, we sometimes see this as a virtue and praise it because it shows a desire for noble actions or recognition for good deeds. However, when someone takes their desire for honour too far—by obsessing over it or seeking honour in inappropriate ways—we criticize it as excessive or inappropriate. The same term ("ambition" or "love of honour") can carry both positive and negative meanings depending on how and to what degree it is exercised.

Aristotle is pointing out that the balanced, virtuous quality—the "mean"—between extremes often doesn't have a specific name. For example, when discussing attitudes toward honor, we can label the extreme of excess as ambition (seeking honor too much or for the wrong reasons) and the extreme of deficiency as unambitiousness (not caring about honor even when it's deserved). Yet the balanced state between the two—seeking honor appropriately and for noble reasons—goes unnamed.

As a result, the two extremes metaphorically "compete" for recognition in its place, essentially dominating the conversation. People tend to talk about the extremes because they're clearer and easier to identify, while the nuanced, virtuous middle ground is harder to define or articulate without a label.

Aristotle is explaining here that, just as with other virtues, when it comes to seeking honor, there’s a balance to be struck. People can desire honor excessively (too much) or insufficiently (too little)—both of which are problematic. However, there is a middle ground, a “just right” way to desire and pursue honor. This balanced approach is what Aristotle sees as virtuous, even though it doesn’t have an official name. It’s a state of being that earns praise because it demonstrates moderation and proper judgment regarding honor, avoiding both extremes. Essentially, it’s about having the right attitude toward recognition—seeking it appropriately and in moderation, without overreaching or undervaluing oneself.

Aristotle is pointing out something subtle about the balance between ambition (the desire for honor or recognition) and unambitiousness (a lack of interest in recognition). He notes that the virtuous "middle" position — the balanced state of character regarding the desire for honor — is difficult to define precisely, and thus has no specific name. This balance might seem, depending on your perspective, like it leans more toward one extreme or the other.

For example:
- If you compare this balanced state to ambition, it might feel more like unambitiousness because it's not overly driven by the desire for honor.
- Conversely, if you compare it to unambitiousness, it might seem closer to ambition because it does not completely reject the idea of honor or recognition.

In a way, this middle position "contains" both extremes — it values honor, but not too much, and avoids disinterest in honor, but not completely. This reflects Aristotle’s broader idea that virtue often lies in finding a thoughtful, appropriate balance between extremes, which in this case are excessive ambition and total lack of ambition.

Aristotle is making an observation about how virtues often exist as a "mean" or balance between two extremes, which are seen as opposites or "contradictories." In this case, he's discussing the virtue related to honor—a balanced, right attitude toward being honored. However, the problem here is that the balanced state (the mean) doesn’t have a proper name in this context, unlike more clearly defined virtues like "courage" or "temperance." As a result, people tend to think of the extremes—ambition (excessive desire for honor) and unambitiousness (a lack of proper desire for honor)—as the primary options, treating them as direct opposites while overlooking the subtle but praiseworthy middle ground.

In essence, Aristotle is pointing out that without a clear name for the virtuous middle, it becomes harder to recognize and value that balance. Instead, people fixate on the extreme behaviors, which leads to misunderstandings about what the virtue truly is. This insight also reflects a broader theme—finding balance between extremes is the core of living virtuously, even if we don’t always have precise labels for those balanced states.