Book 3 / Chapter 5
Paragraph 6 - The Role of Nature and Responsibility in Moral Character
Explanation - Part By Part
"Now some one may say that all men desire the apparent good, but have no control over the appearance, but the end appears to each man in a form answering to his character."
This part suggests that a person might argue that everyone seeks what seems good to them, but they cannot control how things appear to them as "good." In other words, the way people perceive what is good depends on their character or inner disposition. What one person sees as good or desirable may not be the same as what another sees, because their character shapes their judgment of what appears valuable or worthwhile. Thus, our individual moral character heavily influences how we interpret and pursue the concept of "the good."
"We reply that if each man is somehow responsible for his state of mind, he will also be himself somehow responsible for the appearance; but if not, no one is responsible for his own evildoing, but every one does evil acts through ignorance of the end, thinking that by these he will get what is best, and the aiming at the end is not self-chosen but one must be born with an eye, as it were, by which to judge rightly and choose what is truly good, and he is well endowed by nature who is well endowed with this."
Aristotle is responding to a hypothetical objection here: someone might argue that people desire what seems good to them, but they have no control over what seems good—it simply appears to them that way, based on their nature or character. The question raised is whether people are then really responsible for their actions, or if they’re just acting based on how things naturally "look" to them.
Aristotle counters this by suggesting that if someone is responsible for their own state of mind (i.e., their moral character and how they think), they are also responsible for what seems good or desirable to them—because their state of character shapes their judgment about what is good. However, if people aren’t responsible for their state of mind, then they wouldn’t truly be responsible for their bad actions either. In this case, bad actions would just result from ignorance about what is truly good. People would mistakenly think they’re acting toward the "best" outcome, but they wouldn’t realize they’re wrong because of a flaw in how they judge.
This brings up a further complication: if the ability to properly "see" or judge what is good depends purely on natural abilities (something you're born with, like an innate "eye" for moral truth), and you cannot cultivate this skill, then achieving virtue would be a matter of luck or natural talent. In that case, it would hardly be fair to say that virtue is voluntary—because some people would simply be born morally gifted, while others would lack the tools to aim at the good from the very start.
This issue—whether character and virtue are voluntary or determined—is central to Aristotle's inquiry into moral responsibility. He challenges the idea that what seems good to us is out of our control, emphasizing that moral development involves choices and personal responsibility for forming the kind of person you are.
"For it is what is greatest and most noble, and what we cannot get or learn from another, but must have just such as it was when given us at birth, and to be well and nobly endowed with this will be perfect and true excellence of natural endowment."
Aristotle is saying that the ability to discern what is truly good—what we might call moral clarity or wisdom—is the most important and admirable quality a person can have. He emphasizes that this ability cannot be taught or acquired from someone else; rather, it must already exist within a person from birth, as part of their natural disposition. If someone is naturally well-equipped with this ability, they possess a kind of "ideal" or "complete" excellence, based on their inherent qualities. In other words, this natural moral insight is seen as the pinnacle of human endowment—it’s the foundation for making virtuous choices.
"If this is true, then, how will virtue be more voluntary than vice? To both men alike, the good and the bad, the end appears and is fixed by nature or however it may be, and it is by referring everything else to this that men do whatever they do."
Aristotle is raising an important question here: If our ultimate goals or visions of what is "good" are determined by our natural dispositions—or something outside our control—then how can we say that choosing virtue is more voluntary than choosing vice? Both virtuous and non-virtuous people are guided by what appears "good" to them, which seems to stem from their innate nature or way of perceiving things. If this ultimate perception of "the good" is already fixed or given by nature, it would suggest that all our actions—good or bad—are simply consequences of this, rather than fully conscious, voluntary choices.
In essence, he's grappling with the tension between free will and determinism. If people's choices are based on something predetermined (their "vision" of good), can we hold them responsible for being virtuous or vicious? This resonates deeply with ongoing debates today about how much of our behavior is shaped by factors beyond our control, like genetics, upbringing, or environment.