Book 3 / Chapter 1
Paragraph 10 - Voluntary and Involuntary Actions
Explanation - Part By Part
"Since that which is done under compulsion or by reason of ignorance is involuntary, the voluntary would seem to be that of which the moving principle is in the agent himself, he being aware of the particular circumstances of the action."
Aristotle is making a critical distinction here about what makes an action voluntary or involuntary. If an action is done because of compulsion (someone forces you to act against your will) or ignorance (you genuinely don’t know what you’re doing or lack critical knowledge about the situation), then it is considered involuntary.
On the other hand, for an action to be voluntary, the origin or "moving principle" of the action must come from within the person. This means that the decision to act and the effort to carry out the action must come from the individual themselves, and they must also have awareness of the specific details involved in their act. In short: a voluntary action is one where you are in control and fully aware of what you’re doing.
"Presumably acts done by reason of anger or appetite are not rightly called involuntary. For in the first place, on that showing none of the other animals will act voluntarily, nor will children; and secondly, is it meant that we do not do voluntarily any of the acts that are due to appetite or anger, or that we do the noble acts voluntarily and the base acts involuntarily?"
Aristotle is challenging the idea that actions influenced by emotions like anger or appetite should be considered "involuntary." He points out two main problems with framing it this way:
1. Animals and children act from emotions too: If we say actions driven by anger or appetite aren't voluntary, then by this logic, animals and children—who often act based on their emotions or instincts—would never perform voluntary actions. That would be strange, as they clearly have some level of intentionality in what they do.
2. Selective labeling of voluntary acts: Aristotle asks whether this means that we would only label the "good" (or noble) acts arising from emotions as voluntary, and the "bad" (or base) ones as involuntary. He finds this way of categorizing actions absurd because the same emotions (like anger or appetite) can lead to both good and bad actions. It wouldn’t make sense to pick and choose based on the outcome when the cause is the same.
In essence, Aristotle is rejecting the idea that emotions like anger or desire automatically make actions involuntary, as it would lead to arbitrary conclusions and ignore the complexity of human and animal behavior.
"Is not this absurd, when one and the same thing is the cause? But it would surely be odd to describe as involuntary the things one ought to desire; and we ought both to be angry at certain things and to have an appetite for certain things, e.g. for health and for learning."
Aristotle is addressing the notion of whether actions driven by emotions like anger or desires (appetite) can be considered involuntary. He challenges the idea that anything stemming from these internal drives could be seen as outside the realm of voluntary action.
He argues that it would be absurd to label as "involuntary" the very things we ought to seek or feel. For instance, some emotions or desires, such as a desire for learning or health, or even anger in response to injustice, are appropriate and reasonable. These are part of being human, and they guide us toward actions that are purposeful and aligned with our nature.
In essence, Aristotle is saying that just because emotions or desires influence an action doesn't mean it happens against our will—it’s still "us" choosing or acting. There's a distinction here: involuntary actions are marked by ignorance or compulsion, whereas emotions and desires are natural and oftentimes integral to making reasoned decisions.
"Also what is involuntary is thought to be painful, but what is in accordance with appetite is thought to be pleasant."
Aristotle is drawing a distinction here between actions that are done involuntarily (against one’s will or under compulsion) and those that are aligned with one’s appetites (desires or emotional impulses). Actions that are involuntary are typically associated with regret or discomfort once the individual becomes aware of what has been done because such actions go against what the person truly intended. On the other hand, actions done in accordance with one’s appetite (like pursuing what one desires or feels strongly drawn to) generally bring pleasure, as they align with what a person wants in the moment.
In essence, he’s pointing out that it’s inconsistent to call actions driven by appetite "involuntary," because they often bring satisfaction and reflect conscious inclinations, not compulsion or ignorance.
"Again, what is the difference in respect of involuntariness between errors committed upon calculation and those committed in anger? Both are to be avoided, but the irrational passions are thought not less human than reason is, and therefore also the actions which proceed from anger or appetite are the man's actions."
In this part, Aristotle is addressing a critical question: when we make mistakes, should it matter whether those mistakes come from deliberate reasoning ("calculation") or from impulsive emotions like anger? He points out that, while both types of errors should be avoided, there’s no clear reason to treat emotional mistakes (like those made in anger) as somehow less "human" than rational missteps. After all, emotions like anger or appetite are just as much a part of human nature as reason is.
The core idea here is that both rational thought and emotional impulses are intrinsic to who we are as people. Actions driven by emotions like anger or appetite, therefore, are still fundamentally our own actions—they’re not something external or entirely "involuntary." Aristotle contrasts this with the concept of involuntary actions, which are typically painful or regrettable (e.g., caused by ignorance or compulsion). Emotional actions, on the other hand, often involve some pleasure or satisfaction, even if they’re unwise. So, labeling emotional errors as "involuntary" doesn’t really make sense because they reflect our nature and choices as human beings.
"It would be odd, then, to treat them as involuntary."
Aristotle is arguing that actions driven by emotions like anger or desire shouldn't be categorized as "involuntary." These emotions, while powerful and sometimes irrational, are still a natural part of human decision-making. They originate within us, and when we act out of anger or appetite, we're still exercising a degree of choice or agency. To call such actions "involuntary" would be strange because they reflect a part of who we are—our human nature.