Book 2 / Chapter 7
Paragraph 2 - The Mean with Regard to Money and Honour
Explanation - Part By Part
"With regard to giving and taking of money the mean is liberality, the excess and the defect prodigality and meanness. In these actions people exceed and fall short in contrary ways; the prodigal exceeds in spending and falls short in taking, while the mean man exceeds in taking and falls short in spending."
Here, Aristotle is using the concept of a "mean" (a balance or moderation) to discuss how people handle money. Liberality, or generosity, represents the balanced, virtuous approach to giving and taking money. It's about handling money thoughtfully, giving appropriately without being wasteful, and not being overly focused on acquiring or hoarding wealth.
On the extreme ends of this spectrum are two vices: prodigality and meanness. A "prodigal" person spends excessively, often in a careless or wasteful manner, but falls short when it comes to taking or earning money—they might not care to manage their income or resources wisely. On the other hand, a "mean" (or miserly) person is overly focused on acquiring and hoarding money, but they lack generosity or are reluctant to spend when they should.
In essence, Aristotle is pointing out that financial virtue lies in a balance: avoiding wastefulness on one side and stinginess on the other.
"(At present we are giving a mere outline or summary, and are satisfied with this; later these states will be more exactly determined.)"
In this part, Aristotle is essentially saying that the current discussion is just a high-level overview of the ideas. He’s presenting a rough summary of the different virtues, vices, and the "means" between them, without going into too much depth for now. He acknowledges that, later on, he will examine these concepts with more precision and detail.
This is important because it emphasizes that what follows is more like a sketch — a framework — rather than a full, final explanation. He’s laying down the basic blueprint before diving deeper into the nuances. This approach allows readers to first grasp the general structure before tackling the finer points that might require a more detailed analysis.
"With regard to money there are also other dispositions- a mean, magnificence (for the magnificent man differs from the liberal man; the former deals with large sums, the latter with small ones), an excess, tastelessness and vulgarity, and a deficiency, niggardliness; these differ from the states opposed to liberality, and the mode of their difference will be stated later."
Aristotle is extending his discussion of the "mean"—the desirable middle ground between two extremes—this time focusing on how people handle money. He explains that in addition to liberality, which is about appropriate giving and taking with smaller amounts of money, there is another virtue called magnificence. Magnificence applies to the proper handling of large sums of money and is distinct from liberality.
When dealing with large sums of money, Aristotle identifies two extremes or vices:
1. Tastelessness and vulgarity (excess): This happens when someone spends large amounts of money in an inappropriate, over-the-top, flashy, or crude way, often without purpose or elegance.
2. Niggardliness (deficiency): This is the opposite extreme—being overly stingy or unwilling to spend anything, even when it’s necessary and appropriate.
What Aristotle is emphasizing here is that the virtue of magnificence is not just about spending large sums of money, but spending them in the right way, such as for meaningful or worthy purposes. Similarly, these extremes in dispositions (tastelessness/vulgarity versus niggardliness) are not the same as the vices tied to smaller, everyday transactions, which are discussed under liberality. He hints that he will elaborate on the specific differences between these states later in the text.
"With regard to honour and dishonour the mean is proper pride, the excess is known as a sort of 'empty vanity', and the deficiency is undue humility; and as we said liberality was related to magnificence, differing from it by dealing with small sums, so there is a state similarly related to proper pride, being concerned with small honours while that is concerned with great."
Aristotle here builds on his broader idea that virtues are about finding a balance—a "mean"—between two extremes, or vices. In this specific case, he's talking about how people perceive and value honor.
The "mean" or balanced state with regard to honor and recognition is having proper pride. This means valuing yourself and your achievements appropriately—neither overestimating your worth nor undervaluing it. It’s a healthy self-respect that aligns with reality.
If someone goes too far in seeking honor, they fall into empty vanity. Such a person might crave admiration excessively or act in exaggerated ways to appear important, all based on shallow or baseless self-regard. It’s the "too much" side of the spectrum.
On the other hand, if someone doesn’t value their own worth at all, they fall into the deficiency of undue humility. This person doesn’t give themselves the credit they deserve, underestimates their contributions, or shrinks away from recognition, even when it’s warranted.
Finally, Aristotle points out a parallel between honor and what he previously discussed about money: just as "liberality" relates to smaller, everyday exchanges while "magnificence" applies to big, grand displays of generosity, here too, there’s a kind of lower-scale equivalent. Proper pride deals with great honors, while there’s another virtue (though unnamed here) that aligns with how people handle recognition in smaller contexts. Essentially, this suggests that the way we approach "big" versus "small" honors requires a similar sense of balance but might operate slightly differently.
"For it is possible to desire honour as one ought, and more than one ought, and less, and the man who exceeds in his desires is called ambitious, the man who falls short unambitious, while the intermediate person has no name."
Aristotle is explaining that when it comes to seeking honor (recognition or respect from others), there’s a spectrum of behavior. It’s possible to desire honor in the right amount, too much, or too little. The person who wants honor excessively—beyond what is appropriate—is labeled ambitious. On the other hand, someone who cares too little for honor—falling short of what is reasonable—is called unambitious. However, the ideal balance, where a person desires honor in the proper, moderate way, doesn’t have a specific name. This lack of a label for the balanced position reflects how difficult it can be to precisely name or define virtue in every case.
"The dispositions also are nameless, except that that of the ambitious man is called ambition. Hence the people who are at the extremes lay claim to the middle place; and we ourselves sometimes call the intermediate person ambitious and sometimes unambitious, and sometimes praise the ambitious man and sometimes the unambitious."
Aristotle is pointing out that not all moral qualities have established names, which makes discussing them a bit tricky. For example, in the case of ambition, the person at one extreme—the one who desires honor excessively—is called "ambitious," and that term is used to label their disposition ("ambition"). However, the person who desires honor too little doesn’t have an official label. The person who lands in the balanced "middle" position (desiring honor as they should) also doesn’t have a specific name.
This lack of clarity in naming leads to a kind of confusion: people often mislabel or mistake the middle-ground individuals for those at the extremes. For example, someone might call a properly balanced person "ambitious" even though they are not excessively so, or they might be called "unambitious" even though they are simply modest. Additionally, society sometimes praises someone who shows excessive ambition (because they strive for success) and at other times praises someone who shows little ambition (for being humble). This inconsistency in labeling and praising is part of the challenge Aristotle highlights, and he promises to explain this phenomenon more thoroughly later in the text.
"The reason of our doing this will be stated in what follows; but now let us speak of the remaining states according to the method which has been indicated."
Aristotle concludes this section by acknowledging that the terms and judgments around certain virtues and vices can be ambiguous. For instance, when it comes to qualities like ambition, people often disagree on whether it's a positive or negative trait. This inconsistency arises because some extremes in behavior can resemble virtuous behavior depending on the context. Aristotle says he'll explain why this happens later, but for now, he's focused on continuing to describe other virtues and vices, following the same method of identifying the "mean" between excess and deficiency.
In simpler terms: Aristotle is pointing out that our opinions about moral traits can be inconsistent because some qualities at the extremes (like being overly ambitious or not ambitious at all) can sometimes look like the ideal balance, depending on the situation. He acknowledges this inconsistency but moves on to discuss other traits systematically, reserving a deeper explanation for later.