Book 2 / Chapter 6
Paragraph 6 - The Impossibility of a Mean in Certain Actions and Passions
Explanation - Part By Part
"But not every action nor every passion admits of a mean; for some have names that already imply badness, e.g. spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike things imply by their names that they are themselves bad, and not the excesses or deficiencies of them."
Aristotle is pointing out that not everything in life can be balanced into a "mean" or middle ground. Certain emotions (like envy or spite) and certain actions (like adultery, theft, and murder) are inherently bad by their very nature. Unlike virtues, which involve finding a balance between two extremes, these things cannot be "done in moderation" or practiced with a balance that makes them good. Their very essence is tied to wrongdoing, and no amount of context or adjustment makes them right.
"It is not possible, then, ever to be right with regard to them; one must always be wrong. Nor does goodness or badness with regard to such things depend on committing adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the right way, but simply to do any of them is to go wrong."
In this part, Aristotle emphasizes that some actions are inherently wrong, no matter the circumstances or how they are carried out. For example, acts like adultery, theft, or murder cannot ever be justified or made "right" by trying to find some ideal way to execute them, such as choosing the "right person," the "right time," or the "right manner." These actions are ethically bad in and of themselves, so engaging in them is always wrong. Unlike behaviors where virtue lies in finding a balance (a "mean"), these actions fall outside the realm of moral balance because their very nature is unjustifiable.
"It would be equally absurd, then, to expect that in unjust, cowardly, and voluptuous action there should be a mean, an excess, and a deficiency; for at that rate there would be a mean of excess and of deficiency, an excess of excess, and a deficiency of deficiency."
In this part, Aristotle is pointing out the absurdity of trying to categorize certain inherently wrong actions (like injustice, cowardice, or excessive indulgence) using his earlier framework of the "mean." His idea of the "mean" refers to a balanced state between extremes, but he is saying that some actions or traits are fundamentally flawed and do not operate on this scale at all. For example, you can't have a "moderate" amount of unjust behavior or find a middle ground between extremes of cowardice; these qualities or actions are wrong by nature, regardless of degree. Trying to apply the concept of a mean here would lead to nonsense, such as talking about a "moderation of excess" or an "excess of excess," which doesn't make logical sense. Essentially, some things simply don't fit into the moral framework of balance and are wholly negative in every form.
"But as there is no excess and deficiency of temperance and courage because what is intermediate is in a sense an extreme, so too of the actions we have mentioned there is no mean nor any excess and deficiency, but however they are done they are wrong; for in general there is neither a mean of excess and deficiency, nor excess and deficiency of a mean."
This part is a continuation of Aristotle's explanation of how virtue operates as a "mean" between extremes, but he clarifies here that not everything in life can be categorized this way. He argues that some actions and attitudes (like adultery, theft, and murder, or traits like envy and shamelessness) are inherently bad—there’s no “middle ground” or “right way” to perform these actions.
So, when he says “there is no excess and deficiency of temperance and courage,” he’s pointing out that certain virtues, like temperance (self-control) and courage, are already good in themselves and do not have an “extreme” version of them in the sense of being inherently bad. On the flip side, actions like murder or theft don’t have a virtuous version—a person cannot murder “to the right extent” or steal “in moderation.” These things are wrong no matter how they're done, because they're bad by nature.
Essentially, Aristotle is emphasizing that the concept of finding the "mean" only applies to situations where balance or moderation makes sense. For some virtues, they’re already at their best state, and for some wrongdoings, no balancing act will ever make them acceptable.