Book 2 / Chapter 5
Paragraph 4 - Nature of Virtue as a State of Character
Explanation - Part By Part
"For these reasons also they are not faculties; for we are neither called good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling the passions; again, we have the faculties by nature, but we are not made good or bad by nature; we have spoken of this before."
Aristotle is explaining why virtues cannot be considered mere "faculties"—basic capacities or abilities we possess by nature, like the ability to feel emotions (e.g., anger, fear, or joy). He points out that we do not label someone as "good" or "bad," or praise or blame them, simply for having the ability to experience emotions. For example, just because someone can feel anger doesn't mean they are a virtuous or unvirtuous person.
Moreover, these natural faculties or abilities are something we are born with—they are part of human nature. However, being born with the capacity to feel emotions does not make us morally good or bad. Morality and virtue, for Aristotle, arise from something beyond these natural capacities. He references an earlier part of his discussion where he makes it clear that virtues must be cultivated rather than innate.
In short, virtues cannot be reduced to just natural abilities to feel emotions, because having those abilities alone doesn't determine a person's character or morality. Virtue involves something more deliberate and developed through practice and choice.
"If, then, the virtues are neither passions nor faculties, all that remains is that they should be states of character. Thus we have stated what virtue is in respect of its genus."
Aristotle is narrowing down what virtues fundamentally are. He argues that virtues are not simply feelings or emotional experiences (passions), like anger or fear, because those happen to us involuntarily and without moral judgment—we aren't necessarily praised or blamed for just feeling something. Similarly, virtues are not mere faculties (natural abilities or capacities, like the ability to feel emotions), because we are born with faculties, but we're not born inherently virtuous or wicked. Virtue, then, must be something beyond these—it must be a state of character. By this, Aristotle means a stable and intentional disposition, a developed way of being that determines how we act, feel, and choose in life. This is his conclusion about the foundation (or "genus") of virtue.